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PLAYING WITH FIRE? TESTING MORAL HAZARD IN HOMEOWNERS
INSURANCE VALUED POLICIES
Peter Molk*
Abstract
Insurance policy design and regulation continually grapples with
moral hazard concerns. Yet these concerns rest largely on theory-based
assumptions about how rational economic actors will respond to financial
incentives. Advances in behavioral economics call these assumptions into
question.
This Article conducts an empirical test of moral hazard in
homeowners insurance markets. Eighteen states’ “valued policy” laws
require more generous compensation by insurers for certain total house
losses. I test the moral hazard prediction that fire rates will consequently
be higher in these states than in others. Using a private insurance
database on the cause of loss for over four million residential insurance
claims from 2002 through 2011, I find that, surprisingly, loss rates are
significantly lower in valued policy states, not higher. I also use
Louisiana’s unexpected elimination of these laws as an additional means
to assess the laws’ effects. As before, fire rates are significantly higher
when economic incentives appear lower.
These results are inconsistent with standard moral hazard
predictions, but I demonstrate how they are consistent with a broader
conceptualization of moral hazard theory. First, the results show the
importance of recognizing policyholders’ responsiveness to irrelevant
factors that they nevertheless believe will affect their insurance payments,
like housing prices, rather than the low-salience economic factors that
truly determine these payments, like valued policy laws. Second, the
results show how focusing exclusively on policyholder behavior misses
how other actors, like insurance companies, also adjust to mitigate or even
entirely eliminate moral hazard considerations.

*

© 2018 Peter Molk. Assistant Professor, Willamette University College of Law.
Thanks to Lisa Bernstein, Brian Galle, Pat McCoy, Justin McCrary, Mohsen Manesh, Dan
Schwarcz, Aaron Simowitz, Rick Swedloff, Melissa Wasserman, and participants at the
Boston College junior scholars insurance conference, the Stanford/Yale/Harvard junior
faculty forum, the University of Chicago legal scholarship workshop, the University of
Connecticut annual insurance symposium, the Columbia law and economics workshop, the
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies at Cornell, and faculty workshops at Oregon and
Willamette for comments and suggestions.

347

348

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

INTRODUCTION
Insurance is a multitrillion-dollar industry.1 By appealing to policyholders’ risk
aversion, insurance companies provide policyholders with replacement of income
and assets after a loss in exchange for comparatively small upfront premium
payments. This transfer of risk enhances social welfare, providing such valuable
benefits as spreading the risk of unlucky health predispositions;2 promoting efficient
investment projects;3 and serving private regulatory functions.4 The advantages of
private insurance are so compelling that governments even subsidize private
insurance markets5 and the purchase of insurance by private individuals.6

1

NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2015 PROPERTY/CASUALTY & TITLE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY REPORT 1 (2016) ($587 billion in annual property and casualty insurance
premiums) [hereinafter NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2015 HOME/CASUALTY]; NAT’L
ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, LIFE, A&H, AND FRATERNAL YEAR-END INSURANCE INDUSTRY
ANALYSIS REPORT 3 (2016) ($824 billion in annual life related premiums); CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NHE Fact Sheet, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Research
-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
NHE-Fact-Sheet.html [https://perma.cc/E6C3-25CK] (last modified June 14, 2017)
($1,072.1 billion in annual private health insurance premiums).
2
A major initiative of the Affordable Care Act set out to accomplish this goal by
eliminating insurers’ ability to vary health insurance premiums based on these risk
characteristics. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (adding 42 U.S.C. § 300gg).
3
If risk-averse policyholders lost investments in their property upon property
destruction, the uncertainty would push them instead towards safer uses, such as general
savings.
4
See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 247 (2012).
5
See, e.g., Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 101, 116 Stat.
2332 (2002) (creating a government-subsidized terrorism property insurance program); see
generally George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic
Loss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219, 225–35 (1996) (identifying problems with past
government-subsidized insurance programs).
6
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE 80
(2015),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668415.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q3LP-M8HR]
(discussing crop insurance subsidies); Peter Molk, The Government’s Role in Climate
Change Insurance, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 411, 417 (2016) (discussing subsidized
flood insurance) [hereinafter Molk, Government’s Role]; Peter Molk, The Ownership of
Health Insurers, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 873, 905–13 (2016) (discussing cooperative health
insurer subsidies) [hereinafter Molk, The Ownership]. In addition, insurance provided
through employment enjoys the subsidy of avoiding federal tax on the equivalent amount of
income. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 15-B: EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO TAX
FRINGE BENEFITS 3–5 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XT5R-XS4A].
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However, insurance brings the potential for perverse increases in risk levels and
losses, a phenomenon known as moral hazard.7 Because insurance companies agree
to cover some or all of a policyholder’s loss, a policyholder’s incentive to avoid
those losses is reduced.8 With insurance to reimburse if a loss materializes, a rational
policyholder takes fewer precautions against losses and engages in riskier activity in
a riskier way than she would without insurance. These costs can entirely eliminate
insurance’s positive effects.
Moral hazard is a dominant concern of insurance companies and regulators who
must balance protecting policyholder losses against the resultant potential for risk
increase. Much money and time are spent crafting policy language that not only
protects policyholders but also ensures they take appropriate loss-preventative
measures. Yet despite the focus on moral hazard, its effects are mostly derived from
theoretical economic models of policyholder behavior. Whether theory translates
into actual behavior is largely an unanswered question; empirical evidence on moral
hazard is sparse. This Article provides new evidence in the context of homeowners
insurance.
According to economic theory, moral hazard will depend on several factors,
including how adequately insurance payments substitute for policyholder loss, the
policyholder’s ability to control the incidence of loss, and the policyholder’s
calculated economic rationality. 9 Straightforward applications of these factors
accurately predict some observed insurance market moral hazard. For example, long
term disability insurance claims rise as insurance payments increase and preliminary
waiting periods decrease.10 And the generosity of workers’ compensation has been
found to have no significant impact on either the number of workplace accidents or
the number of serious accidents, as insurer dollars are a poor substitute for
wellbeing.11 But other observed behavior is seemingly inconsistent with this theory.
Diabetics, for instance, are apparently willing to trade health for dollars despite the
imperfect substitutability between the two; studies find diabetics to be unhealthier

7

While the term “moral hazard” originated in the insurance industry, its intuition has
since been applied to other markets. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral
Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996) (exploring the origins of the term); Gilles Chemla &
Christopher A. Hennessy, Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard, 69 J. FIN. 1597 (2014)
(applying the idea of moral hazard to asset securitization).
8
See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral
Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4, 6 (1983) (“[T]he more and better insurance
that is provided against some contingency, the less incentive individuals have to avoid the
insured event, because the less they bear the full consequences of their actions.”).
9
See generally Baker, supra note 7, at 277–83 (discussing these factors, among others).
10
David Autor et al., Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability
Insurance, 6 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 110, 112 (2014).
11
Richard J. Butler & John D. Worrall, Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral
Hazard in Workers’ Compensation, 58 J. RISK & INS. 191, 191 (1991); Emily A. Spieler,
Perpetuating Risk? Workers’ Compensation and the Persistence of Occupational Injuries,
31 HOUS. L. REV. 119, 147–48 (1994).
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in states that require insurers to cover the disease.12 Similarly, driving safety is worse
when automobile liability insurance premiums do not incorporate prior accidents.13
Homeowners insurance markets are not immune to moral hazard fears.
Applying the standard moral hazard model to homeowners insurance provides
reason for concern. Homeowners may have no sentimental attachments to their
homes and might be better off using insurance proceeds as a means of monetizing
an illiquid asset.14 In the worst of circumstances, homeowners might collect more in
insurance proceeds than the value of their home, making house destruction a wise
investment.15 And even factors seemingly outside homeowners’ direct control, such
as natural disasters, may be exacerbated by homeowners’ increased willingness to
live in risky areas because of an insurance backstop.16
On the one hand, some losses—those from forest fires, for example—will be
largely outside the control of homeowners. Other homeowners may act based on
norms or morals, rather than a cold calculation of insurance payments. And for still
other homeowners, insurance proceeds may only poorly compensate for the lost
security and sentimental value when one’s homestead goes up in flames.17
Yet even when theoretical models uniformly predict moral hazard, studies show
that actual behavior can diverge substantially from these predictions.18 When theory
presents a mixed picture, as here, empirical evidence is even more valuable.
Unfortunately, although homeowners insurance is a robust market with a staggering
12

Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard, 50
J.L. & ECON. 519, 537 (2007) (finding diabetics to be unhealthier in states that require
insurers to treat the disease). Other observations are more in line with standard moral hazard
theory predictions. See Liran Einav et al., Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance,
103 AM. ECON. REV. 178, 193 (2013) (finding that policyholders who are also more likely to
consume medical services also select into more comprehensive health insurance plans,
facilitating this moral hazard); Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand
for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 251, 272
(1987) (finding greater use of healthcare services when subsidized by insurance); Baker,
supra note 7, at 242 (suggesting these outcomes follow from standard moral hazard theory).
13
Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident
Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 388 (2004) (empirically arguing
that automobile insurance leads to more traffic fatalities); Baker, supra note 7, at 284–85
(suggesting that actual drivers would not make this tradeoff).
14
Baker, supra note 7, at 278 (acknowledging the substitutability of money for
investment property).
15
Arguments along these lines have long been advanced by the insurance industry,
regulators, and academics. See infra Part I for discussion of these arguments.
16
The availability of flood insurance has long been thought to have spurred economic
development in loss-prone coastal areas. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Bagstad et al., Taxes, Subsidies,
and Insurance as Drivers of United States Coastal Development, 63 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 285,
287 (2007); Molk, Government’s Role, supra note 6, at 425 (examining subsidized
insurance’s exacerbating role on policyholder moral hazard).
17
Baker, supra note 7, at 278 (noting in addition that “money cannot replace . . . much
of what is important in life”).
18
See supra text accompanying notes 10–11.
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$88 billion in annual premium payments,19 empirical studies of homeowner moral
hazard are few and draw only limited conclusions.20
This Article conducts an original test of moral hazard in homeowners insurance
markets, using a private insurance industry database on the cause of loss for over
four million homeowners insurance claims from 2002 through 2011. By exploiting
variation in state valued policy insurance laws that either do or do not allow
policyholders to collect more insurance proceeds than the value of their homes, I test
directly whether policyholders respond to economic incentives as standard moral
hazard theory predicts.
The results are surprising. I find that loss rates from covered causes are lower,
rather than higher, in those states that allow policyholders excess financial
recoveries. I estimate these lower loss rates to correspond to roughly $250 million
per year in residential property damage. Moreover, taking advantage of a change in
Louisiana law that removed policyholders’ excess profit potential in 2008, I
similarly find that loss rates from covered causes rise, rather than fall, in Louisiana
after the profit incentive is removed. These empirical results directly contradict
standard moral hazard theory predictions.
The findings have several useful implications. Most obviously, they show that
the presumed moral hazard costs of valued policy laws are not nearly as great as
critics fear. In 2013, industry representatives successfully opposed Colorado’s
proposed adoption of these laws by pointing, among other things, to the laws’
potential to lead “people in need of money . . . [to] deliberately set their houses on
fire just to get an amount greater than the value of their homes—indeed, arson for
profit is the leading cause of property loss, totaling millions of dollars in damage
and investigation costs each year.” 21 These results suggest just the opposite is
occurring. Adjusting the theoretical costs and benefits of these laws for how actors
behave improves an insurance debate that has continued since the first of these laws
was passed 140 years ago.22
The implications are not confined to the question of how best to regulate the
multibillion-dollar homeowners insurance market and its underwriting and loss
settlement practices.23 The results show the usefulness of casting moral hazard as a
concept that focuses on more than just the hard economic factors that affect

19

NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2015 HOME/CASUALTY, supra note 1, at 4–5.
Two recent exceptions are Michael D. Eriksen & James M. Carson, A Burning
Question: Does Arson Increase When Local House Prices Decline?, 84 J. RISK & INS. 7, 8
(2017); Paul R. Goebel & David M. Harrison, Money to Burn: Economic Incentives and the
Incidence of Arson, 21 J. HOUSING RES. 49, 49 (2012). For discussion of these and their
limitations when applied to actual insurance markets, see infra Part I.
21
PROP. CASUALTY INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., SPECIAL REPORT, THE COLORADO
HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE MARKET: THE IMPACT OF NATURAL CATASTROPHES ON COSTS
AND PREMIUMS 4 (2013).
22
See infra Part II (discussing the origin of and debate over homeowners insurance
valued policy laws).
23
See supra text accompanying note 1.
20
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policyholders, as has traditionally been the case. 24 The factors policyholders believe
will affect their insurance payouts, rather than factors that truly determine those
payouts, are what actually influence behavior. While this appears a simple point, it
implies that, as I find, factors that have no bearing on insurance payouts—like
housing prices—can affect behavior, while other factors that actually affect
insurance payouts—like valued policy laws—have little impact.
Traditional moral hazard models that focus exclusively on policyholder
behavior ignore how other actors may respond in surprising ways. One explanation
for this Article’s surprising empirical findings is that insurers react to valued policy
laws by altering their underwriting practices, which in turn reduces policyholders’
loss incentives and loss rates. Models that focus exclusively on policyholder
responses thereby miss the full panoply of interactions that result, which contribute
to sharp divides between theoretical predictions and actual behavior.
By instead appreciating how economic and noneconomic factors affect the
behavior of a wide variety of actors, we can develop more reliable predictions of
when moral hazard costs will be significant and how best to address those costs.
Applying this approach to the case of homeowners insurance shows that although
the results differ markedly from traditional predictions, they are perfectly consistent
with this broader conceptualization of moral hazard.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I discusses the concept of moral hazard
in the context of homeowners insurance. It identifies the conditions under which
traditional economic theory predicts moral hazard will emerge in homeowners
insurance markets, and it shows how insurers respond to mitigate these effects
through contractual terms and pricing in standard homeowners insurance policies.
Insurers operate in a regulated environment, and state regulators restrict
insurers’ efforts to reduce moral hazard. Part II discusses one way: the “valued
policy laws” that eighteen states have adopted and that form the basis for this
Article’s empirical analysis of moral hazard. These laws apply to residential fire
losses, and they require insurers to overcompensate policyholders who buy
insurance that exceeds the value of their home. I provide context for these laws,
showing how they reintroduce moral hazard concerns and generate testable
hypotheses that guide the later empirical analysis.
24
Insurance theory and regulation has been greatly influenced by the neoclassical law
and economics movement since at least Kenneth Arrow’s work on moral hazard in the 1960s.
See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 941–67 (1963). Recent studies have shown that actual behavior does not
always align with neoclassical economic predictions, but these insights have been slow to
penetrate insurance regulation. Much of the most compelling work on the mismatch between
classical economic predictions and actual behavior has been performed by insurance scholar
Tom Baker. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT:
HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 1–200 (2010); Tom
Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 275, 275–316 (2001); Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, “You Want Insurance
with That?” Using Behavioral Economics to Protect Consumers from Add-on Insurance
Products, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 1–60 (2013).

2018]

PLAYING WITH FIRE?

353

Parts III and IV provide the empirical analysis used to test these hypotheses.
Part III describes the data used in the analysis. Part IV then proceeds to test for moral
hazard in homeowners insurance in two independent ways. First, it tests whether
loss rates from fire differ between states with and without valued policy laws, as
well as whether other potentially relevant metrics, such as fluctuating home prices,
could be driving losses. Next, it uses Louisiana’s unexpected rollback of valued
policy laws in 2008 as a quasi-natural experiment to determine whether eliminating
this moral hazard source impacts fire loss rates. The surprising results in each case
show a complete lack of moral hazard in the manner that traditional economic
models predict; fire loss rates are significantly lower, not higher, in states with
valued policy laws that require potential policyholder overcompensation.
Finally, Part V evaluates the implications from these results. In addition to
informing the debate on valued policy laws’ costs and benefits, this study offers
broader lessons for calibrating theoretical economic models to predict actual
behavior with greater accuracy. I show how a reconceptualization of moral hazard
as a phenomenon sensitive to both economic and noneconomic factors, as well as a
phenomenon that influences the behavior of policyholders and other actors, will
provide a much better match between theoretical predictions and empirical reality
going forward.
I. THE POTENTIAL FOR HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE MORAL HAZARD
The case for moral hazard in homeowners insurance hinges on an
understanding of how insurance influences policyholders’ behavior and how
insurers respond to this influence. The following subparts analyze each in turn.
A. Policyholders’ Incentives
If they face the full consequences of their actions, rational individuals act only
if that action’s benefits exceed its costs.25 However, when individuals externalize

25

As studies have shown, individuals do not always behave in such a rational manner
in insurance markets. See, e.g., Robert Eisner & Robert H. Strotz, Flight Insurance and the
Theory of Choice, 69 J. POL. ECON. 355, 356 (1961) (finding that policyholders purchase
flight insurance at implausible markups from expected losses); Unusual Insurance Policies,
GEICO (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.geico.com/more/saving/insurance-101/unusualinsurance-policies [https://perma.cc/F3CB-6XQ4] (discussing the prevalence of alien
abduction insurance); Baker & Siegelman, supra note 24, at 2 (tackling the apparent
irrationality of individuals’ purchase of add-on insurance, such as collision damage waivers
for rental cars); Molk, Government’s Role, supra note 6, 414 (examining the apparent
irrational refusal by policyholders to purchase flood insurance). Nor are the apparent
anomalies confined to insurance markets. See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY
IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2010) (providing an
accessible summary of several apparent anomalies outside insurance). Nevertheless,
standard moral hazard theory, as well as a multitude of studies, predict that individuals
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some or all of an action’s negative consequences to others, destructive behavior can
occur where the costs of that behavior exceed its benefits. This intuition, while not
new, continues to be a key driver behind foundational areas of law and regulation.26
Moral hazard is a particular case of this general idea, originating in the context
of insurance. 27 Insurance, by design, mitigates the negative consequences from
certain policyholder losses, meaning that the costs of those losses are externalized
to the insurance company. Moral hazard posits that individuals will respond to
having insurance by engaging in riskier activities than they would otherwise; with
more severe losses from those activities. 28 For example, an insured homeowner
might decide not to purchase an alarm system for her house, leaving the home more
open to theft or fire losses and increasing risk levels because the insurer will cover
burglary losses.
Of course, not all individuals act based on a careful calculation of the relevant
financial costs and benefits. Some will be more influenced by a desire to conform to
social expectations, or to do what is right or “moral.” Indeed, the origins of the term
moral hazard reflects insurers’ early recognition that some policyholders were more
likely to take loss-preventative measures irrespective of financial consequences.29
But financial consequences undoubtedly play a role in many people’s decision
making, and when insurance tilts that calculus more heavily in policyholders’ favor
by mitigating or entirely eliminating financial costs, perverse consequences can
result.

respond to changing economic incentives across a wide variety of circumstances. See, e.g.,
Arrow, supra note 24, at 961 (raising such a concern for homeowners insurance and fires).
26
For example, large areas of land use law are derived from the need to adjust
individual decisionmaking for the costs and benefits those decisions impose on society. See
Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 694–99 (1973). See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV.
713 (1996) (analyzing the use of law in controlling externalities in a variety of contexts).
27
For more on the insurance origins of the term moral hazard, see Baker, supra note 7,
at 250–60.
28
See generally Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 92 Q.J. ECON. 541
(1979) (modeling policyholder and insurer reactions to moral hazard); Baker, supra note 7,
at 270 (distinguishing between “ex ante” and “ex post” moral hazard).
29
Baker, supra note 7, at 250. Mutual insurers, whose policyholders are owners of the
insurer, have been particularly adept at appealing to these individuals, since averted losses
now also reduce premiums for the policyholder—and, perhaps more importantly, the
policyholder’s neighbors. See Patrician Born et al., Organizational Form and Insurance
Company Performance: Stocks versus Mutuals, in THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTYCASUALTY INSURANCE 167, 172, 191 (David F. Bradford ed., 1998) (discussing how mutual
property insurers concentrate more on attracting low-risk policyholders than do other
insurers); Peter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REV. 899, 920–21
(2014) [hereinafter Molk, Lack of Cooperatives] (discussing the comparative advantages of
mutual property insurers); Molk, The Ownership, supra note 6, at 893 (finding policyholderowned health insurers promise superior moral hazard reduction).
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This observation raises the first instance where we can expect moral hazard to
arise: when policyholders are financial profit maximizers rather than motivated by
nonfinancial considerations. 30 As an initial matter, we might therefore expect
commercial insurance markets, whose policyholders are business entities attuned to
profit maximization, to be more prone to moral hazard than consumer insurance
markets whose policyholders are individuals with nonfinancial motives.31
Being a profit maximizer encourages moral hazard; so too does the extent to
which losses are externalized to the insurer, instead of being borne by the
policyholder. The second factor that will influence moral hazard is therefore the
amount by which insurance payments offset losses. When policyholders bear an
appreciable portion of a loss, their incentive to avoid a loss aligns with the insurers’.
If, on the other extreme, a policyholder is actually better off should a loss occur, she
has the incentive actively to seek these losses, against the insurer’s interest. We
might therefore expect moral hazard to be more problematic with automobile
insurance if the insurer replaces a destroyed car with a brand new one (making the
policyholder better off than before the loss) than if the insurer instead provides a
payment far less than the destroyed car’s worth.32
Even among financially motivated policyholders, however, moral hazard will
be less of a problem if money is only an incomplete substitute for the loss that
policyholders suffer, such as in the case of bodily harm. The third factor for moral
hazard is therefore money’s ability to substitute for the policyholder’s loss. 33 If
money poorly compensates policyholders for their loss, moral hazard concerns will
be lower.34 For example, it is not unreasonable to suppose that money can never
fully compensate for the pain, suffering, emotional distress, and loss in enjoyment
that death entails. We might therefore suppose moral hazard to be less important in
life insurance than other areas.

30

Baker, supra note 7, at 277 (referring to “loss minimizers”).
Of course, not all businesses are motivated principally by profit maximization;
nevertheless, this conception of large enterprise has been remarkably influential. Molk, Lack
of Cooperatives, supra note 29, at 944 (discussing the shareholder primacy model and its
criticisms); cf. ANDREW TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS 95 (1982) (asserting that one does
not picture “large corporations” like “Corning Glass torching an outmoded facility to get the
money to modernize,” as opposed to individuals and small business policyholders).
32
The latter strategy has been long employed by automobile insurers, but insurers have
recently begun offering the former coverage despite the moral hazard considerations. See,
e.g., Liberty Mutual Ins., New Car Replacement Coverage, https://www.libertymutual.com/
auto/car-insurance-coverage/new-car-replacement-insurance
[https://perma.cc/22XBFWBM] (last visited Oct. 20, 2017); Ameriprise, New Car Replacement Coverage and GAP
(Guaranteed Auto Protection) Coverage, https://www.ameriprise.com/auto-homeinsurance/learning-center/insurance-tips-for-drivers/auto-insurance-coverage-made-simple/
new-car-replacement-coverage-gap-coverage.asp [https://perma.cc/7H9V-WP8P] (last
visited Oct. 20, 2017).
33
Baker, supra note 7, at 277–79.
34
Id.
31
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Finally, moral hazard will be problematic when individuals have control over
whether a loss occurs as well as the extent of the loss that results.35 If a policyholder
cannot make losses more likely or more severe regardless of her actions, then there
is little worry that insurance will affect anything, and therefore little reason to worry
about moral hazard. For example, individuals typically have little control over when
or whether they require emergency treatment; consequently, health insurance that
covers only nonelective treatment costs would have little impact on loss rates and
severity and exhibit little moral hazard.36
We can apply these factors to see if moral hazard presents theoretical concerns
in homeowners insurance. The first factor—policyholders’ behavior as rational
economic actors—weighs moderately in favor of moral hazard in homeowners
insurance. Although by no means all individuals are motivated by financial
considerations, financial incentives undoubtedly affect at least some homeowners’
decisions.37 For example, homeowners evidence a greater willingness to engage in
a strategic mortgage default when the financial rewards from doing so increase.38
Further, state insurance fraud bureaus have reported increases in potentially
fraudulent homeowners insurance claims when economic conditions worsen and the
rewards from insurance fraud rises.39 These suggest that at least some homeowners
integrate financial considerations into their decision making.
Homeowners also routinely have the bulk of their home losses covered by
homeowners insurance, 40 so the second factor—the degree that insurance offsets
losses—will also weigh in favor of moral hazard. If policyholders purchased enough
coverage, their out of pocket expenses may total only several hundred dollars when
35

Id. at 279–80.
Indeed, health insurance began as a product for exclusively these expenses because
of moral hazard concerns if elective treatments were covered by insurance. ROBERT
CUNNINGHAM III & ROBERT M. CUNNINGHAM JR., THE BLUES: A HISTORY OF THE BLUE
CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD SYSTEM 6 (1997).
37
For an early theorization of how economic incentives will drive behavior, see Gary
S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 169–215
(1968). For discussion of the several studies applying this approach to the housing market,
see Goebel & Harrison, supra note 20, at 50–52.
38
Luigi Guiso et al., The Determinants of Attitudes Toward Strategic Default on
Mortgages, 68 J. FIN. 1473, 1479 (2013).
39
See, e.g., Tony Pugh, Recession Is Fueling a Boom in Insurance Fraud, MCCLATCHY
DC BUREAU (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/
economy/article24576331.html [https://perma.cc/MWW5-VKEZ] (reporting results of a
survey of state insurance fraud bureaus).
40
See, e.g., Levon Barseghyan et al., The Nature of Risk Preferences: Evidence from
Insurance Choices, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2499, 2504 (2012) (finding only 1.6% of
households had insurance policies with deductibles exceeding $1,000); California Wildfires
Highlight Need to Protect Homes Against Underinsurance, MARSHALL & SWIFT (Aug. 17,
2009), https://www.marshallswift.com/pressreleases.aspx?ReleaseID=15 [https://perma.cc/
P8XN-HS4Y] (reporting results from survey that 64% of homes are “underinsured for
insurance purposes,” with an average of 81% of replacement costs covered by insurance for
these underinsured homes).
36
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their million-dollar house is destroyed. The situation worsens when we consider that
a house rebuilt from insurance payments may be worth considerably more than the
preloss house;41 the rebuilt house will have suffered no depreciation and can include
the latest innovations unavailable at the time of original construction.42 But that is
not the end of the story. If policyholders buy more insurance than the value of their
home, they conceivably directly profit when the house is destroyed.43 Since a home
often constitutes the majority of an individual’s net worth,44 an ability to earn even
a modest return on this asset through an overinsured loss may tempt the most moral
among us.
The third factor influencing moral hazard—how well money compensates for
the loss—also weighs moderately in favor of moral hazard’s being a problem. For
some individuals, money is unquestionably only an incomplete substitute for an
insured home loss. Cash payments go only so far in offsetting the nonfinancial loss
of security from knowing one’s home has been burglarized or from watching one’s
family homestead go up in flames.45 For these individuals, homeowners insurance
presents little moral hazard concern. Others, however, view their homes more as an
asset with little sentimental value,46 and for these individuals, financial payments
can be expected to provide a relatively complete substitute for the loss suffered by
property destruction.
Finally, individuals have some, but by no means total, control over whether
their homes experience a loss and the severity of that loss. Consequently, the final
factor of ability to control losses also weighs moderately in favor of moral hazard.
41

The nature of the problem is the same, but the severity is less, when a house is only
partially destroyed, as the homeowner then gains an upgrade only to that portion of the house.
42
Even if the policyholder values the enhancements less than the market, policyholders
can always sell the rebuilt house and use the proceeds to buy a depreciated house similar to
the original home, profiting by the difference.
43
As the next Section shows, insurers take significant steps to ensure this situation does
not occur.
44
U.S. Census Bureau, Net Worth and Asset Ownership of Households: 2011,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2011/demo/wealth-and-asset-ownership--2011.html
[https://perma.cc/2LNB-5MGV] (last updated May 24, 2016) (finding median household has
$69,000 net worth, of which home equity accounts for 75%).
45
See Baker, supra note 7, at 278 (“[M]oney cannot restore the sense of security lost
when a storm destroys a home or when a thief breaks in.”).
46
We might expect these individuals to be recent purchasers of homes, as opposed to
those who have occupied the same place for decades. See generally Brena Swanson, This
MBA Chart Shows Existing Home Turnover, HOUSINGWIRE (June 26, 2015),
http://www.housingwire.com/articles/34324-this-mba-chart-shows-existing-home-turnover
[https://perma.cc/6FUU-VURW] (quoting the Mortgage Bankers Association as saying that
normal housing turnover “is about 7.5%”). Even these individuals might experience some
emotional attachment, but presumably less than long-time residents. See generally Samantha
Sharf, 10 Mistakes Even Savvy Stock Investors Make, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2013/10/10/10-mistakes-even-savvy-stockinvestors-make [https://perma.cc/A98Q-4AZF] (referring to the “emotional attachments”
that some investors experience with certain financial assets, like stocks).
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For some losses, such as destruction by arson, policyholders may have direct control.
For others, policyholders can increase the probability of a loss occurring even if they
cannot directly cause a loss. Leaving one’s front door open may increase the chance
of a burglary, for example, while failing to keep a fire extinguisher in one’s kitchen
may increase the chance of severe fire losses.47 But some losses appear completely
outside policyholders’ control, such as destruction by natural hazards, and present
little moral hazard risk.48
Pulling these factors together, we see a reasonable theoretical case for
homeowners insurance moral hazard emerging. Two factors weigh strongly in favor
of moral hazard problems; two others weigh in favor but less so.
Unsurprisingly, insurers have long recognized this residential moral hazard
potential.49 Indeed, it has even spawned popular jokes on the subject.50 And having
recognized the problem, homeowners insurers take a number of steps to mitigate it.
B. Insurers’ Contract Response
Standard homeowners insurance contracts take two general approaches in
limiting policyholder moral hazard.51 The first restricts policyholder behavior, while
the second modifies policyholders’ economic incentives.
47

Ten Ways to Avoid a Kitchen Fire, AM. RED CROSS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.red
cross.org/news/article/Avoid-Kitchen-Fires-Use-Red-Cross-Tips [https://perma.cc/L5BGZ47A].
48
Even for these losses, however, homeowners typically have some limited control
over whether a loss occurs by choosing to live in an area subject to natural disasters. See
generally Molk, Government’s Role, supra note 6 (discussing this limited measure of control
over natural disaster losses).
49
See, e.g., George W. Goble, The Moral Hazard Clauses of the Standard Fire
Insurance Policy, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 410, 410–14 (1937) (recounting early collective effort
by insurers to design standard homeowners policy that addressed policyholder moral hazard
potential).
50
See, e.g., TOBIAS, supra note 31, at 108.
These two older fellas are walking down the beach in Miami. “My factory burned
down,” says the first, “and I retired on the insurance.”
“That’s funny,” says the second. “My factory got washed away in a flood, and I
retired on the insurance, too!”
“Really?” asks the first, incredulous—“How do you start a flood?”
Id.

51

Homeowners insurance is overwhelmingly written using collectively drafted
standardized forms that do not vary across insurance companies. For a study on the degree
of this standardization and the areas in which insurers differ, see Daniel Schwarcz,
Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1264–69 (2011).
For a current version of the standard form contract, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL
SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 185–209 (6th ed.
2015).
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1. Restricting Policyholder Behavior
Under this first approach, homeowners insurers refuse to pay policyholders
who engage in behavior indicative of certain moral hazard situations. The
contractual prohibitions take a variety of forms. Most directly on point for the later
analysis, insurers refuse to pay a policyholder for losses that the policyholder causes
intentionally.52 If a policyholder burns down her overinsured house to collect the
insurance proceeds, insurers have no legal obligation to pay, addressing the most
egregious form of moral hazard.
Beyond intentional losses, moral hazard can manifest through failing to take
adequate measures to prevent losses—such as the homeowner who does not replace
the dead battery in a smoke detector, or who stores gasoline near the gas heater.
Insurers cannot refuse to pay in all these circumstances without gutting policies of
their value to policyholders. 53 Instead, insurers adopt exclusions that prevent
payment for particular enumerated actions that are typically a product of moral
hazard. Losses excluded include gradual structural collapse, damage from frozen
water pipes, thefts from a long-vacant home, bird, insect, and rodent damage. 54
Minimal intervention by policyholders can prevent most or all of these losses;
making policyholders liable for these losses encourages some care that rational
moral hazard would otherwise leave lacking.
Yet these contractual terms are only an incomplete solution to the moral hazard
concern. Some policyholders might cause intentional losses but still recover from
the insurer, because intent can be difficult to prove. For others, the enumerated list
of exclusions will not deter behavior coincident with moral hazard. Failure to replace
batteries in a smoke detector does not jeopardize coverage, for example, nor does
failure to lock the front door, stock fire extinguishers, or a host of other activity
predicted by moral hazard theory. In other words, the potential for moral hazard
remains.
Employing contractual terms that manage policyholder behavior is not the only
way that insurers address the problem. Next, this Article considers the ways that
insurers align policyholders’ economic incentives with insurers’ and society’s
incentives.
2. Modifying Economic Incentives
Insurers adopt three approaches to push policyholders’ cost-benefit analysis
away from policyholder-centered decision making that externalizes costs to others
and towards decisions that align with insurers’ and society’s interests. The first is
52

ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 51, at 198.
Balancing prevention of moral hazard against covering ordinary negligence is a
difficult one for insurers to strike. See generally Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in
Insurance Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1457, 1497–98 (2017) (discussing the lack of increasein-hazard clauses in homeowners insurance).
54
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 51, at 194.
53
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attached as a condition to homeowners insurance and is known as the insurable
interest requirement. This provision requires the policyholder to have a financial
stake at risk to be able to buy insurance, and limits the amount of insurance available
to the size of that stake.55 The insurable interest requirement means that even if a
policyholder obtains insurance with a maximum payment exceeding the value of the
underlying house, the insurance company pays at most the amount needed to replace
the house.56
The insurable interest requirement is an effective means of deterring many
manifestations of moral hazard. Even if a policyholder obtains insurance with a face
value several multiples above a house’s value, the condition limits the policyholder’s
recovery to the amount needed to replace the destroyed structure.57 A homeowner
with a $100,000 house, for example, will be paid only $100,000 from an insurer
even if she obtained $1 million in property coverage. Properly applied, the insurable
interest requirement therefore transforms the insurance policy from a promise to pay
the insurance policy’s face value into a promise to pay the lesser of the policy face
value or the amount needed to replace the destroyed property. Thus, even if a
policyholder disguises an intentional loss as an unintentional one, or even if a
policyholder intentionally increases the probability of a loss occurring by leaving
the front door unlocked, the insurable interest requirement limits her recovery to
keep moral hazard considerations in check.
The second way insurers affect homeowners’ cost-benefit calculation is to
impose deductibles that require policyholders to bear some of the loss alongside the
insurer. These deductibles are typically a fixed dollar amount,58 on the order of $500
55

See, e.g., Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 948 P.2d 1264, 1271–72 (Wash.
1997); Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: Collateral Sources
Under the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 591, 608 (2003).
56
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 51, at 198–99. Homeowners insurance provides
for either the amount the destroyed property was worth (“actual cash value”), or, more
commonly, the amount needed to replace the destroyed property (“replacement cost”). See
TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 179 (3d ed. 2013) (referring to the “overwhelming success” of replacement cost
policies); ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 51, at 199 (providing default payment for
damage to the home as replacement cost); Schwarcz, supra note 51, at 1317 n.196 (noting
that mortgage companies require homeowners to have insurance with replacement cost
coverage); see generally Johnny Parker, Replacement Cost Coverage: A Legal Primer, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295 (1999) (discussing the difference between replacement cost and
actual cash value coverages).
57
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 51, at 199.
58
For specific hurricane or windstorm losses, insurers frequently adopt percentage
deductibles, requiring policyholders to bear a fixed percentage of losses (typically 1% to 5%)
rather than a fixed dollar amount of losses. See, e.g., Background on: Hurricane and
Windstorm Deductibles, INS. INFO. INST. (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.iii.org/issueupdate/hurricane-and-windstorm-deductibles
[https://perma.cc/A9D6-4HUF].
The
traditional justification for these percentage deductibles is that it eases insurers’ burden in
covering correlated losses, which otherwise can be difficult for insurers to manage. Id. But
see Molk, Government’s Role, supra note 6, at 413–16 (critiquing this argument).
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or $1,000,59 and require the policyholder to pay the deductible amount before the
insurer covers any portion of a loss. 60 The theory of cost-sharing devices like
deductibles is that by requiring policyholders to bear some of a loss, policyholders
will have a financial incentive to prevent the loss from happening, or to mitigate the
loss’s severity.61 Yet because the ratio of a $500 or $1,000 deductible to a total home
loss is so small, this financial incentive encourages meaningful loss prevention only
for the smallest of losses, leaving many instances of moral hazard unaddressed.
The final way that insurers alter policyholders’ financial calculations occurs not
through the homeowners insurance contract directly, but rather through how these
policies are priced. Homeowners insurance, like most forms of insurance, is
experience rated: individuals with no history of prior losses pay less for insurance
than comparable individuals with recent losses.62 Premium increases following a
loss indirectly discourage policyholder moral hazard, by making it more costly for
a policyholder to have a loss. 63 For this system to be an effective deterrent,
policyholders must know that prices will increase following a claimed loss;
policyholders must still want to buy homeowners insurance after the price increase;
and the price increase following a loss must be significant. Evidence suggests that
these conditions are met with mixed success.64
59

Barseghyan et al., supra note 40, at 2.
A few specifically enumerated small loss items are covered by homeowners insurers
with no deductible. See, e.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 51, at 191–92 (fire
department service charge; credit card, electronic fund transfer card or access device, forgery
and counterfeit money).
61
See generally Molk, Government’s Role, supra note 6, at 420 (discussing the lossavoidance signals sent by insurance premiums).
62
E.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 72–74 (1986). Insurers facilitate this pricing system through the use of a
communal nationwide database, known as the Comprehensive Loss Underwriting Exchange,
that provides a history of policyholders’ claims against their homeowners insurer. Personal
Reports,
LEXISNEXIS,
https://personalreports.lexisnexis.com/fact_act_disclosure.jsp
[https://perma.cc/BG4P-NKWR] (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). In the commercial context,
where the stakes are much larger, insurers may go beyond simple experience rating and base
premiums on more individualized factors, and they may also provide individualized lossavoidance advice. See generally Victor P. Goldberg, Tort Liability for Negligent Inspection
by Insurers, in RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 65, 65–81 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. ed.,
1980) (exploring implications in commercial markets for liability for this advice). The
smaller size of most residential policies makes these features very rare in homeowners
insurance markets.
63
In this way, future premium increases act much like deductibles and other costsharing techniques, with the policyholder sharing the loss by paying higher future insurance
premiums.
64
Although price increases after a loss can be significant, and although policyholders
may want to continue purchasing homeowners insurance after a loss (or be required to do so
by their mortgage company), many policyholders appear unaware that claims against their
insurer will result in premium increases. See, e.g., Alina Tugend, The Peace of Mind of Home
Insurance, Unless You Use It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/
10/01/business/the-peace-of-mind-of-home-insurance-unless-you-use-it.html?_r=0 [https://
60
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3. Residual Moral Hazard
As the prior subpart has shown, insurers reduce moral hazard in homeowners
insurance by aligning policyholders’ incentives with insurers’ though several
contractual mechanisms. These efforts, however, are incomplete. Worse yet,
insurers operate in a heavily regulated arena, and not all regulators allow insurers
unfettered access to these moral hazard reduction efforts. In particular, regulators in
eighteen states restrict insurers’ use of the insurable interest requirement because of
perceived policyholder unfairness that can result, rekindling moral hazard worries.
The next part introduces this regulatory limitation, which forms the backbone of the
empirical tests for moral hazard that I conduct.
II. REINTRODUCING MORAL HAZARD: VALUED POLICY LAWS
Recall that under standard homeowners insurance, insurers agree to pay
policyholders the lesser of the maximum face value of insurance in the policy, or the
cost to replace the property (or less commonly, the value of the property—for
purposes of this Article, this distinction is unimportant). Therefore, if an insurer
issues a policy with a $100,000 limit for a house that costs only $50,000 to replace,
the insurer pays only $50,000 when that house is completely destroyed. This
insurable interest requirement is a significant check on moral hazard.
Yet even though this provision mitigates moral hazard, it strikes many as unfair
by seemingly allowing insurers to collect premiums from policyholders on excess
insurance that policyholders will never use. 65 Eighteen states have responded by
implementing valued policy laws.66 Although there are some minor variations, at
their core these laws require insurers to pay homeowners the full insurance policy
limit whenever a home is completely destroyed by fire, and sometimes by other
causes. 67 In the example above, therefore, a policyholder with a $100,000 home
insurance policy limit would collect $100,000 from the insurance company subject
to a valued policy law, even if the destroyed house was worth only $50,000.

perma.cc/43CV-4RMR].
65
See, e.g., Tedford v. Sec. State Fire Ins. Co., 278 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Ark. 1955).
66
See generally JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND KNUTSEN ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE § 15.04[B], at 15-73–74 (4th ed. 2016) (identifying 20 states with
valued policy laws). Two of these states are excluded from having valued policy laws:
California, whose valued policy law applies only to certain personal objects inside the
dwelling, and to the structure only upon payment of an additional fee by the policyholder,
see CAL. INS. CODE §§ 381.2, 2051–52, 2054 (2017); and Louisiana, whose valued policy
law no longer applies to homeowners insurance, for reasons discussed fully see infra Part
IV.B.
67
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-905 (2015) (requiring payment of policy limits for
total losses from fire, tornadoes, windstorms, and lightning); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-24102 to 103 (2009) (extending valued policy law to specifically-valued personal property as
well).
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Valued policy laws can encourage moral hazard, because they make it possible
for policyholders to profit substantially from losses. Although fraud and intentional
property destruction still forfeit insurance coverage even with a valued policy law,68
nothing prohibits policyholders from “encouraging” a loss through storing
flammable material onsite or similar means, 69 and intentional losses that go
undetected or unproven by insurers must also be compensated in accordance with
valued policy laws.70
Unsurprisingly, insurers have pushed back against these laws since they were
first adopted in 1874. 71 New Hampshire homeowners insurers refused to issue
policies in the state for five years after the state adopted a valued policy law in
1885.72 Insurers even unsuccessfully challenged valued policy laws’ legality before
the United States Supreme Court in 1899.73 They have appealed to public opinion,
characterizing the laws as “an incentive to crime . . . offer[ing] to the morally weak
a temptation to commit the crime of arson for money”74 and as “an invitation to and
a statutory reward for arson.” 75 Critics were not confined to insurers; the Ohio
Superintendent of Insurance cast the effects of his state’s valued policy law in the
following negative light:
[It] convert[s] the whole scheme of insurance into a money-making and
gambling transaction. It is a statute that may make it more profitable to
destroy property than to keep it. It is a statute that places before every evildisposed person the temptation to over-insure and then burn his property
for the gain there is in it. And even where the assured is honest he is liable
to be made more indifferent as to the care he should take of his property
by over-insurance.76
These arguments continue in the present day. For example, in 2013, the
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America characterized valued policy laws
68

See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 33-32-5 (2016) (applying valued policy law in the
absence of fraud or criminal fault).
69
See supra text accompanying notes 52–54.
70
See, e.g., Seider v. O’Connell, 612 N.W.2d 659, 673 n.8 (Wis. 2000) (“Arson is
difficult to detect and hard to prove because ‘torch men’ are frequently used by arsoninclined insured.”).
71
See id. at 671. An in-depth history of Wisconsin’s valued policy law is contained in
SPENCER L. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 240–49 (1960).
72
HAYDEN’S ANNUAL CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1899–1900
618 (1900); The Valued Policy Law: Home View of the New-Hampshire Fire Insurance Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1885 (quoting PORTSMOUTH TIMES, Sept. 11, 1885).
73
Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 564–67 (1899). The laws were challenged
under a theory of violating insurers’ fundamental right to make contracts of insurance, which
hinged on promoting the insurable interest requirement violated by valued policy laws. Id.
74
HAYDEN’S ANNUAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 72, at 338.
75
Seider, 612 N.W.2d at 673 n.8.
76
HAYDEN’S ANNUAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 72, at 445.
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as “not sound policy” that would “result in higher total costs that are likely passed
on to all policyholders,” while stating that these laws may lead people to
“deliberately set their houses on fire just to get an amount greater than the value of
their homes.”77 Nor is the source of recent criticism confined to insurers: academics
generally disparage valued policy laws as well, concluding that their adverse impacts
on moral hazard more than offset any potential benefits to policyholders.78
Proponents do not deny the laws’ potential to generate moral hazard, but they
point to two principal benefits. First, the laws deter insurers from collecting high
premiums based on an inflated policy face value and later opportunistically paying
policyholders the lesser value of the house after a loss.79 Because valued policies
force insurers to pay full policy face value for a total loss, proponents characterize
them as furthering principles of fairness while promoting more accurate
underwriting by insurers.80
Second, valued policy laws reduce disputes over the value of destroyed
property after a loss occurs.81 Because the insurer must pay the face value of an
insurance policy for a total loss, the policyholder and insurer need not argue over
the replacement cost or value of destroyed property after a loss happens; all that
matters is the amount of insurance that was purchased. For policies in other states,
however, the insurer pays the lesser of replacement cost and the policy’s maximum

77

SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 1, 4.
ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
633 (5th ed. 2012) (noting that it is “likely that valued policies increase moral hazard” and
that “it is very possible that the public would be better served if valued policy statutes were
repealed”); ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TEXT 142 (1971) (concluding that
“[o]n balance, the principle of indemnity would be better served by repeal of valued policy
statutes”). But see STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 66, § 15.04[B], at 15-76, 15-79, 15-81
(acknowledging “at least the theoretical danger that valued policies will overcompensate
policyholders” but cautioning that the moral hazard concern is tempered by unreimbursed
losses coinciding with home destruction, such as emotional losses or the time spent dealing
with insurers before concluding that “[v]alued policy laws make sense on fairness, efficiency,
and consumer protection grounds.”).
79
See, e.g., Gambrell v. Campbellsport Mut. Ins. Co., 177 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Wis.
1970).
80
Id.
81
See, e.g., Musselman v. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 271, 274
(Mont. 1992).
78
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limit, requiring the insurer and policyholder to agree over what this replacement cost
is.82 When that property no longer exists, this agreement can be difficult to achieve.83
Whatever valued policy laws’ virtues, their main criticism is that they result in
greater moral hazard among rational policyholders as a matter of economic theory.
Because valued policyholders receive at least as much insurance compensation as
analogous traditional policies, their financial incentive to prevent losses will be, at
most, equal to that of traditional policyholders. In egregious cases when the amount
of insurance significantly exceeds property values, valued policyholders will have
the financial incentive to encourage losses. It is not difficult to find real life instances
where this occurs. Recent examples include an $85,800 insurance payment for
$54,400 in replacement cost damage;84 $80,000 in insurance proceeds for a $25,000
actual cash value loss; 85 and $2,100,500 from an insurer for $1,750,000 in
replacement cost damage.86
The extent to which policyholders respond to these moral hazard incentives and
translate theoretical worries in actual problems is unknown. Although insurers and
academics generally criticize valued policy laws for inducing moral hazard and
increasing fire rates, the criticism is supported principally by theoretical assumptions
of how individuals rationally respond to financial incentives. Yet there are many
reasons to doubt whether policyholders will respond to valued policy laws’ financial
incentives by increasing fire loss rates. For one, policyholder understanding of
insurance agreements is notoriously poor,87 and if policyholders do not appreciate
the difference between traditional insurance reimbursement and that required by
valued policy laws, the laws may have little impact on policyholder behavior. For
another, individuals have been observed to disregard rational economic incentives,

82

See id. Some of this savings by valued policy laws is undermined by a shifting of
disputes into whether a loss is a “total loss,” rather than disputes over the replacement cost
of that loss. See, e.g., Wickman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 616 F. Supp. 2d 909, 916–17
(E.D. Wis. 2009) (involving a dispute over whether a damaged home was a total loss,
triggering the state’s valued policy law); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Second Chance Inv., LLC,
827 N.W.2d 766, 770–72 (Minn. 2013) (refusing to allow insurer to have an appraisal panel
determine whether a loss was a total loss). The characterization of a loss as total versus partial
matters only for whether valued policy laws apply, and is therefore not an issue in non-valued
policy law states.
83
See, e.g., Tedford v. Sec. State Fire Ins. Co., 278 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Ark. 1955).
84
Cambier v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 738 N.W.2d 181, 182 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). The
appellate court overturned a trial court entry of summary judgment for the policyholder
because it found the policyholder’s property was used as rental property, rather than a
personal residence.
85
Johnson v. Mt. Morris Mut. Ins. Co., 809 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011).
86
Second Chance Inv., 827 N.W.2d at 768.
87
See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 51, at 1326 (“[E]ven motivated consumers are illequipped to comprehend the meaning of typical homeowners policies, which are, in many
ways, uniquely impenetrable.”).

366

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

not only in insurance markets 88 but also across a variety of other situations. 89
Layered on top of this is the only moderate moral hazard picture seen earlier when
applying general theory principles.
This Article seeks to answer this issue by testing whether valued policy laws
are associated with higher fire loss rates among insured homeowners. Fire rates were
chosen for two reasons. First, fire is the only cause of loss that is covered by all
states’ valued policy laws. 90 Some, but not all, states require additional sources to
be covered as well. Second, fire losses are frequently identified as indicative of
moral hazard.91 Fires, of course, can be started intentionally for insurance fraud and
are therefore under policyholders’ control,92 but even many unintentional fires can
be prevented with appropriate care. Finally, valued policy laws require total losses,
and fire is the only loss source included in the data that can conceivably produce a
total loss.

88

See supra text accompanying note 25.
ARIELY, supra note 25 at xix–xx; see generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489–508 (1998) (discussing
several behavioral anomalies).
90
See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 66, at 15-74. Some, but not all, states require
additional sources to be covered as well. However, none of the valued policy laws apply to
any other loss source in the data. The reason for many states’ valued policy law limitation to
fire losses appears to be because many of these laws were originally passed when
homeowners insurance covered exclusively fire losses. Homeowners policies have since
expanded to cover a variety of loss sources. For more on this distinction, see infra text
accompanying notes 124–127.
91
See Eriksen & Carson, supra note 20, at 12.
92
The scope of these intentional fire losses, while difficult to estimate, appears
significant. See, e.g., RICHARD CAMPBELL, NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, INTENTIONAL FIRES 1
(2017),
http://www.nfpa.org//-/media/Files/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics/MajorCauses/osintentional.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9AY-ARGD] (estimating approximately
260,000 intentional property fires and $1 billion in associated property damage annually);
Ins. Info. Inst., Background on: Insurance Fraud, (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.iii.org/article/
background-on-insurance-fraud [https://perma.cc/E8KF-WRAZ] (estimating at least 10% of
property/casualty insurance claims to be fraudulent); Pugh, supra note 39 (63% of state
insurance fraud bureaus report an increase in home arsons during most recent recession).
89
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This test for moral hazard also yields several side benefits beyond an analysis
of valued policy laws’ effect by analyzing additional factors that influence fire claim
rates. Policyholders may incorporate a variety of other information into their fireprevention decisions, some of which might be predicted by standard economic
theory, and some of which should have little relevance. For instance, popular
wisdom predicts that falling home prices will make policyholders more likely to
have an insured fire loss to capitalize on their perceived overinsurance, despite the
fact that popularized home prices play no role in the amount that insurers pay for a
loss.93 By incorporating information on recent home prices into the analysis, we can
determine whether policyholders respond to these indicators that should not affect
their decision making, and therefore obtain a better sense for how individuals make
decisions.
The next part discusses the data used for the empirical analysis.
III. TESTING MORAL HAZARD: THE DATA
The principal data for this project originate from a proprietary insurer database
of 4.1 million residential homeowners insurance claims from 2002–2011. Insurance
organizations voluntarily file claims in the database to investigate policyholders’
loss histories and identify suspect claims. Because insurers’ decision to participate
is voluntary, as is their decision regarding whether to provide some or all their claims
made, the dataset does not cover all insurance claims across the country.
Nevertheless, it has achieved considerable success in participation rates, including
participation (in one form or another) by insurers representing 99% of the
property/casualty industry by premium volume.
Each claim in the dataset contains the date of the underlying loss, the state in
which the loss occurred, and the source of the loss. Claims in the database are from
the following five causes of loss: burglary, fire or smoke damage, personal property
destruction, theft, and vandalism or malicious mischief.94 Claims from other causes
of loss, such as water or wind damage, are not provided in the dataset. No other
information, such as the street address or city of the loss or the loss amount, was
reliably or consistently included in the dataset.
The claim data covered all fifty states for the period 2002 through 2011.
Figure 1 depicts their composition by loss type.

93

See Eriksen & Carson, supra note 20, at 8–10.
Fire damage and smoke damage are two separate causes in the dataset, but they were
grouped together in the analysis to identify claims based directly (fire) and indirectly (smoke)
on fire damage.
94
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Figure 1
Claims by Loss Type and Year
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Personal property destruction constituted a small share in each year that is not visible in this Figure.

I augmented each claim in the claim dataset with several additional indicators
that affect or are believed to affect policyholder moral hazard. These indicators can
be divided into economic indicators and noneconomic indicators.
A. Additional Economic Indicators
Several economic indicators are thought to impact policyholders’ decision
making and contribute to moral hazard. Foremost among these are home values. It
is frequently thought that when the difference grows between falling property values
and the constant face value of a homeowners insurance policy, collecting from one’s
insurance becomes more profitable. 95 I therefore included state-level data on
changes in home prices as tracked by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.96

95

This view is widely shared. See, e.g., TOBIAS, supra note 31, at 107 (suggesting a
money-making opportunity by burning down over insured homes).
96
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, House Price Index Datasets, https://www.fhfa.gov/Data
Tools/Downloads/Pages/House-Price-Index-Datasets.aspx [https://perma.cc/K2ND-88MJ]
(last visited Oct. 20, 2017). Prices were not adjusted for seasonality. The Agency provides
the price index quarterly; this index was converted into a monthly number assuming linear
monthly changes from one quarter to the next. State level figures, rather than more local data,
were used to match the claims data, which were provided only on a state level basis.
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Despite popular focus on home prices as a driver of moral hazard, fluctuating
home prices play no role in how much an insurer pays, and they should therefore
play little role in the rational policyholder’s decision making.97 Although the point
is often overlooked, home price numbers include not just the value of the dwelling,
which is insured, but also the value of the land on which that dwelling sits, the right
to build on that land, and a variety of other factors. 98 None of the other factors are
insured.99 The value of a dwelling—again, the component of the popular housing
price figure that is insured—remains relatively constant because it is determined
simply by construction costs and depreciation, 100 which are largely stable over
time.101 Most of the popularized gyrations in housing market prices are not changes
in the insured value of the house itself, but instead are capitalized into the noninsured
value of the land, the right to build, or other noninsured factors. 102 A significant
relationship between claims behavior and housing practices would therefore
represent an interesting, and unexpected, source of moral hazard.
I also included data on housing construction costs. Because insurance covers
the value of the housing structure, which is based on housing construction costs,
97

Some have argued that gaps between recently declined housing prices and stable
insurance values will encourage fire rates as policyholders “sell” their homes to the insurer
at the inflated insurance amount. See Eriksen & Carson, supra note 20, at 8, 12; Goebel &
Harrison, supra note 20, at 49–50. However, standard insurance contracts offer higher
replacement coverage only if the policyholder actually replaces her property (precluding a
“sale” to the insurer); the insurance contract reserves the right to pay lesser actual cash values
if the property is not replaced. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 51, at 263–64.
98
These factors include information ranging from the quality of a public school district,
to local crime rates, to the availability of comparable houses, among a host of others. See
Replacement Cost vs. Market Value, STATE FARM, https://www.statefarm.com/simpleinsights/planning/replacement-cost-vs-market-value [https://perma.cc/5VYE-QUNX] (last
visited Oct. 20, 2017).
99
See, e.g., Fla. Ins. Council, Reconstruction Costs, Not Market Value, Key to
Homeowners Insurance, http://flains.org/fact-book-othermenu-38/904-property-insurancebackground/7104-reconstruction-costs-not-market-value-key-to-homeowners-insurance317
.html [https://perma.cc/24Y7-CHGF] (last visited Oct. 20, 2017) (discussing the difference
between insurer-covered reconstruction costs, and market value); Replacement Cost v.
Market Value, supra note 99 (contrasting the popular “market value” figure with the
replacement cost figure that insurers cover).
100
See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 66, at 8-3–8 (identifying insurers’ typical use
of “actual cash value” as “the cost to rebuild the property less the reduction in the value of
the property caused by depreciation” and “replacement cost” as “based on modern
construction (or reconstruction) costs”); see generally Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong,
442 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982) (discussing the different judicial techniques for measuring
replacement cost and actual cash value).
101
For example, analysis of construction cost data maintained by Engineering NewsRecord shows that only 3% of metropolitan area-month combinations had a 12-month
change (positive or negative) of more than 10% from 2002 through 2011, and 0.2% had a
change exceeding 15%. For additional discussion of this data source, see infra text
accompanying notes 103–104.
102
See supra text accompanying note 99.
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changes in these costs will affect insurance payments and may therefore factor into
policyholders’ decision making. To incorporate this information, I used percentage
changes in two construction cost indices published by Engineering News-Record,
the only source to publish monthly construction cost estimates at a sub-national
level. 103 The indices are published for twenty metropolitan areas around the
country.104 States with more than one indexed metropolitan area were assigned the
average across areas; states with no indexed metropolitan area were assigned the
index for the closest metropolitan area.
Finally, I included the growth rate in statewide income per capita105 and the log
of the statewide monthly unemployment rate.106 These two indicators were included
to track the general economic health of policyholders. Low incomes or high
unemployment might drive policyholders to “cash out” potentially overinsured
homes who would otherwise resist in times of a good economy, so each could be
thought to affect claims behavior.107
B. Additional Noneconomic Indicators
Noneconomic indicators may also impact policyholder behavior. Lender
foreclosure laws are thought to affect policyholders’ intentional loss decisions,
because collecting from one’s insurance policy for a total loss can act as a substitute
for the foreclosure process.108 Therefore, if the foreclosure process becomes more
onerous, fire claims can be expected to rise. 109 To capture characteristics of the
mortgage foreclosure process, I apply indices typically used to study subprime

103
More information about the two indices can be found at Construction Economics,
ENG’G NEWS-RECORD, http://www.enr.com/economics [https://perma.cc/A29K-NXH2]
(last visited Oct. 20, 2017). The principal difference between the two indices is the labor
component, with one index incorporating specialized labor rates and the other index
including only general labor rates. I averaged together the percentage change in each index
to develop a composite construction cost index.
104
Id.
105
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis quarterly per capita income data were
converted to monthly figures assuming linear changes from one quarter to the next. Per capita
income was not adjusted for seasonality. For information on the Bureau of Economic
Analysis data, see U.S. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts,
http://www.bea.gov/regional/ [https://perma.cc/M54E-DMFM] (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
106
For monthly unemployement rates, not adjusted for seasonality, see U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject,
https://www.bls.gov/data/ [https://perma.cc/RAT2-5XC5] (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
107
See Goebel & Harrison, supra note 20, at 50–52 (collecting statements to this effect).
For more on this “moral” aspect of moral hazard, see Baker, supra note 7, at 250–52; see
also supra text accompanying notes 30–31 (discussing this in the context of homeowners
insurance).
108
See Goebel & Harrison, supra note 20, at 57.
109
Id.
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lending and foreclosure laws. 110 The indices capture whether the state allows
nonjudicial foreclosure; lenders’ right to pursue any deficiency remaining on the
mortgage after selling the foreclosed property; and whether homeowners have a
right of redemption allowing them to reclaim a pending foreclosure from the
mortgage company.111
I also include the statewide housing vacancy rate. 112 Higher vacancy rates
might lead to more property destruction; with fewer nearby houses populated with
watchful eyes intentional property destruction becomes easier and unintentional
fires may develop into larger ones before they are noticed. Higher vacancy rates may
also capture residual indications of a stagnant real estate market, such that “selling”
one’s house to an insurance company through an insurance claim is more attractive
than selling it on the open market.113 On the other hand, high vacancy rates could
also be associated with higher burglary, theft, property destruction, and vandalism
rates, which would tend to reduce fire claim odds.
Finally, I include statewide precipitation information collected by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which collects these data for each state
except Hawaii. 114 In addition to the monthly precipitation total, I included an
indicator variable for whether the precipitation fell within the bottom 10% of all
monthly totals collected by the Administration from 1895 through 2017. These two
variables capture both the average effect from an incremental change in precipitation
as well as any unique effect from low precipitation extremes.

110

Quinn Curtis, State Foreclosure Laws and Mortgage Origination in the Subprime,
49 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 303, 306–08 (2013).
111
Id.
112
These data are available annually from the U.S. Census. U.S. Census Bureau,
Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS), http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/
index.html [https://perma.cc/43R7-YTA8] (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). Annual numbers were
converted into monthly figures assuming linear changes from one year to the next.
113
See Goebel & Harrison, supra note 20, at 49–50. Although this explanation has been
suggested, recall that insurers often condition total loss payments on using the money to
rebuild one’s home, which eliminates homeowners’ ability to monetize an illiquid house
asset through insurance. See supra text accompanying note 58.
114
E-mail from William Brown, Meteorologist, Nat’l Ctrs. for Envtl. Info., Nat’l
Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., to Mary Rumsey, Reference & Instructional Servs.
Librarian, Willamete Univ. Coll. of Law (Sept. 28, 2017) (on file with author).
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C. Additional Indicators
In addition to the data explicitly included in the model, a variety of other factors
could be expected to influence fire rates. For example, some areas of the country are
more susceptible to wildfires than others. These areas might reasonably be assumed
to have higher fire loss rates wholly independent of other factors. To capture residual
factors, the models include a variety of state, region, and time-specific fixed effect
variables depending on the particular model being tested. These variables capture
factors that the model does not explicitly include when those factors remain constant
over a period of time.
Many intuitive factors that are not explicitly included will be captured in these
fixed effect variables. For example, the impact of a state or region’s susceptibility to
wildfires, its vigorousness of criminal prosecutions, its population’s penchant for
crime, and cultural differences across states or regions all are incorporated into these
fixed effects variables—if those impacts remain constant over the period of time
captured by the fixed effect variable (yearly, or the entire sample period, depending
on the model). Certain specifications of the models also account for state-calendar
month or region-calendar month fixed effects and countrywide year-month fixed
effects. These are designed to incorporate differences in state or regional fire rates
that vary by season, and nationwide year-month factors such as extreme climate
conditions or a national disruptive event. The fixed effects that are incorporated into
any particular model are indicated for each model.
IV. EMPIRICAL TESTS FOR MORAL HAZARD
This Part conducts two tests for moral hazard in homeowners insurance, using
as its primary data source the insurance industry claims database described
previously. First, I test whether the odds of an insurance claim occurring because of
fire—as opposed to other reasons like burglary or vandalism—are higher in states
with valued policy laws compared to states without these laws. The intuition driving
this analysis is that because valued policies compensate policyholders at least as well
as comparable nonvalued policies, we should expect more insurance claims to be
filed for fire losses—the source of loss to which valued policy laws apply—in valued
policy law states.
Second, I also test the impact of valued policy laws by looking to a unique
experience in Louisiana. Louisiana’s Supreme Court unexpectedly rejected its
valued policy law in 2008. This event allows us to isolate valued policy laws’ effect
on claims by determining whether insurance fire claim rates in Louisiana vary
significantly before and after the change.
The following two subparts describe the two tests and their results.
A. Cross-Sectional Comparison
The first test for policyholder moral hazard compares fire loss rates in states
with and without valued policy laws. If policyholders respond to rational economic
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incentives, then we would expect fire rates to be higher in states with valued policy
laws than in states without, because of valued policies’ higher payout rates.
As a preliminary inquiry into this issue, the proportion of the number of fire
claims to total claims can be compared in states with and without valued policy
laws.115 Figure 2 does so. As the figure reveals, the initial results are not promising
for a policyholder moral hazard story. In all but the final year of the sample period,
fire rates are lower, not higher, in states with valued policies than in states without.
Figure 2
Fire Claims Rates: States With and Without Valued Policy Law
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This initial analysis does not provide definitive results on its own, however,
because there could be other differences correlated with the presence of valued
policy laws that explain the difference in fire claim rates. Indeed, as Figure 3 shows,
states with valued policy laws are relatively concentrated in the middle of the United
States, which might naturally feature lower incidence of fires due to, perhaps,
comparative immunity from forest fires, regional norms against intentional fire
setting, economic characteristics, or other reasons.

115
This article identifies states with valued policy laws by individually examining the
insurance statutes of all fifty states. The examination yielded the same collection of states
identified by others as having valued policy laws. See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 66,
§ 15.04[B], at 15-73–74; see also supra text accompanying note 66 (discussing comparison
with others’ identification).

374

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

Figure 3
Distribution of States with Valued Policy Law

Therefore, I conduct a systematic comparison of states with and without valued
policy laws, controlling for various factors that might explain fire loss rates. This is
done by performing a logistic regression. Logistic regressions are used to model
binary dependent variables: in this case, whether an individual claim submitted to
an insurer stems from a fire loss, or instead from a nonfire loss (burglary, personal
property destruction, theft, or vandalism). The outcome of an individual insurance
claim—a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if due to fire, and 0 if due to any
other cause—is regressed against the explanatory variables identified in Part III.
When the explanatory variable has a positive estimated coefficient, it means that an
increase in the value of that explanatory variable is associated with increases in the
odds that a filed claim will be due to fire damage; conversely, when the explanatory
variable has a negative coefficient, increases in the value of that explanatory variable
correlate with reduced odds of a claim resulting from fire damage. 116 Table 1
contains the results of this analysis for the entire sample of claims.
The negative estimate for the valued policy law variable signifies that the
presence of a valued policy law is associated with reduced odds that a claim will be
due to fire, relative to another cause. The estimate is significant in the statistical and
popular sense—it implies that the odds of claims being due to fire in valued policy
law states are only 83% to 84% of the odds in a comparable state without valued
policy laws. Contrary to expectations, valued policies are correlated with lower rates
116

A one-unit increase in an explanatory variable’s value will impact the probability of
a claim’s being due to fire by a factor of e raised to the power of the explanatory variable’s
coefficient estimate.
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of insured fire losses rather than higher rates. In other words, the valued policy law
results from Table 1 are not consistent with standard predictions.
Table 1 also shows that recent housing price declines—although not
construction costs—are correlated with higher fire rates. We might cast this result
as consistent with moral hazard. Even though construction costs, and not home
prices, determine insurance payouts, 117 if policyholders believe that insurance
payments are conditioned on house prices (as is popularly assumed), 118 then we
might expect homeowners to encourage fire losses when recent housing price
declines widen the gulf between real estate values and insurance amounts.
Table 1 is also notable for the absence of other significant relationships among
variables and fire rates. In most models, most of the variables we might expect to be
associated with homeowner moral hazard—construction costs, individual wealth,
unemployment rates, and judicial characteristics of the foreclosure system—have no
significant relationship with fire claim probabilities.

117
118

See supra text accompanying notes 98–102.
See supra text accompanying note 95.
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Table 1
Predictors of Claims Due to Fire
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
--------------Total Sample-------------Valued Policy Law
Construction Cost Change
(12 month)
Housing Price
Change (12 month)

-0.184**

-0.167**

(0.081)

(0.078)

-0.000

-0.007

0.004

0.003

(0.012)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.013)

-0.014***

-0.001

-0.010*

0.013

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.011)

Income per Capita Growth
Rate (12 month)

0.009

-0.003

-0.000

-0.011

(0.013)

(0.012)

(0.014)

(0.011)

Unemployment
Rate (Log)

-0.126

0.000

-0.189

0.737**

(0.129)

(0.162)

(0.151)

(0.356)

Housing Vacancy
Rate (Log)
Precipitation (monthly
inches)
Precipitation (extreme
dummy)
Foreclosure Terms
Deficiency: Most
Borrower Friendly
Deficiency: Med.
Borrower Friendly
Deficiency: Least
Borrower Friendly
Nonjudicial
Foreclosure
Redemption
Right Allowed
N

-0.322*** -0.297***
(0.086)

-0.094

-0.121

(0.080)

(0.088)

(0.074)

-0.022

-0.017

-0.031**

-0.024**

(0.015)

(0.012)

(0.014)

(0.011)

0.175**

0.173**

(0.080)

(0.074)

-0.030
(0.143)
0.097
(0.160)
0.038
(0.158)
-0.063
(0.083)
-0.040
(0.083)

-0.035
(0.135)
0.088
(0.159)
0.030
(0.152)
-0.065
(0.081)
-0.041
(0.080)

0.200*** 0.213***
(0.074)

(0.063)

4,078,284 4,078,284 4,078,284 4,078,284

Region Fixed Effects

Y

Y

N

N

Region-Year Fixed Effects

N

Y

N

N

State Fixed Effects

N

N

Y

Y

State-Year Fixed Effects

N

N

N

Y

Year-Month Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on log-odds of a reported
loss being due to fire or smoke versus other loss sources. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
state-month level to correct for autocorrelation by state/month
combinations over time.

However, even though most traditional variables have little impact on fire claim
propensity for the sample as a whole, perhaps the factors have selective impacts
according to whether a state requires valued policies. For example, insurers may
respond to valued policy laws by issuing fewer policies with face values that exceed
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the house’s value because insurers must pay the full face value in these states.119
This response might mean housing price or replacement cost changes will have a
larger impact in valued policy law states—where a slight price decrease might make
the difference between overinsurance and underinsurance—than in other states,
whose houses might more often have an overinsurance insurance “buffer” built in.
To explore this issue, I repeated the analysis on two subsamples: those states
with valued policy laws, and those states without. Table 2 contains the results. As
Table 2 shows, the results are not meaningfully different between subsamples. The
implications from these results are explored fully in the next Part.
Table 2
Predictors of Claims Due to Fire: By State Type
(1)
(2)
No Valued Policy
Law Only

(3)
(4)
Valued Policy
Law Only

Construction Cost Change
(12 month)

0.003

-0.000

-0.001

0.010**

(0.014)

(0.018)

(0.005)

(0.004)

Housing Price Change (12
month)

-0.010

0.017

-0.002

0.001

(0.007)

(0.014)

(0.003)

(0.004)

-0.015

-0.013

0.012

-0.004

(0.023)

(0.012)

Income Per Capita Growth
Rate (12 month)

(0.015)

(0.008)

Unemployment
Rate (Log)

0.031

1.131*

-0.240**

0.258

(0.211)

(0.579)

(0.100)

(0.219)

Housing Vacancy
Rate (Log)

-0.048

-0.132

-0.125*

-0.058

(0.124)

(0.102)

(0.071)

(0.048)

-0.011

-0.003

(0.012)

(0.008)

Precipitation (monthly
inches)

-0.035** -0.030**

Precipitation (extreme
dummy)

0.277*** 0.294***

N

(0.015)
(0.075)

(0.013)
(0.059)

-0.065

-0.062

(0.053)

(0.053)

2,699,765 2,699,765 1,378,519 1,378,519

State Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

State-Year Fixed Effects

N

Y

N

Y

Year-Month Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on log-odds of a reported
loss being due to fire or smoke versus other loss sources. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
state-month level to correct for autocorrelation by state/month
combinations over time.
119

Indeed, this is one of the responses envisioned by valued policy law proponents. See
supra text accompanying note 79; STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 66, § 15.04[B] p. 1574.
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B. Difference-in-Differences Analysis
The cross-sectional comparison of states with and without valued policy laws
suggests that valued policy laws do not cause higher fire rates. This analysis can be
bolstered by taking advantage of a unique judicial event that occurred in Louisiana
in 2008 to conduct a second, independent test of valued policy laws’ effects.
Until May 2008, Louisiana was a robust valued policy law state, requiring
insurers to indemnify homeowners at full policy face value for total fire losses.120
Unexpected change came courtesy of the state’s Supreme Court in Landry v.
Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company,121 decided May 21, 2008, which
effectively ended Louisiana’s valued policy law.122 In finding valued policy laws did
not apply to the plaintiff homeowner, the Court determined that Louisiana’s valued
policy law applied only to “fire insurance,” as opposed to the more popular
homeowners insurance that the policyholder had.123 The determination was based on
the valued policy law statute’s reference to “fire insurance” but not “homeowners
insurance.” Formally, residential fire insurance and homeowners insurance are two
different insurance policies.124 As a practical matter, however, modern homeowners
insurance policies have all but swallowed up narrower fire insurance policies,
leaving residential fire insurance policies of little practical significance. 125 A
determination126 that Louisiana’s valued policy law applied strictly to fire insurance,
120

See, e.g., Farmers-Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Katherine Ins. Co., 693 So.
2d 876, 881 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
121
983 So. 2d 66 (La. 2008).
122
Id. at 82.
123
Id. at 74 n.10. The Court also based its finding on the fact that Louisiana’s valued
policy law allowed insurers to opt out of its provisions as long as policyholders were supplied
written notice during the policy application process. Id. at 80–81; see also LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:1318(A) (2017). This latter finding appears to be of diminished importance. It is rather
unusual for policyholders to receive such notice—the typical homeowners insurance
application instead involves policyholders supplying basic information in exchange for a
premium estimate, followed later by a policy, without intervening information about policy
terms or property valuation methods. See, e.g., Frught v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 27 So. 3d 270,
271 (La. 2010) (reversing a grant of summary judgment to an insurer because of factual
dispute over whether policy application set forth alternative to valued policy law); Barham
v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 144 So. 3d 1166, 1173 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (describing homeowners
insurance application via phone); Schwarcz, supra note 51, at 1320–22 (discussing the
homeowners insurance application process).
124
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:6 (2017); LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 148:4 (3d ed. 2016).
125
Fire insurance policies originated at a time when insurers were more reluctant to
cover non-fire risks, but have since been effectively replaced by more comprehensive
homeowners insurance. For discussion of the progression from fire insurance to more general
homeowners insurance, see RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 124, at § 149:2.
126
Although initially framed as dicta, this determination by the Louisiana Supreme
Court has been widely followed in its jurisdiction. Indeed, the Supreme Court soon
characterized this dicta as a holding, reflecting the perception shared by other courts. Taranto
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rather than modern homeowners insurance policies that covered fire losses, therefore
rendered the law inapplicable to most policyholders.
This judicial evisceration of Louisiana’s valued policy laws was quite a surprise.
Insurers had not raised the distinction between fire insurance policies and
homeowners policies in their litigation of the case, instead assuming that statutory
references to fire insurance policies included by implication their modern
homeowners insurance counterparts.127 This assumption was part of a wider judicial
history, reinforced by court decisions in Louisiana and elsewhere, that extended
statutory references of “fire policies” to fire losses covered by comprehensive
homeowners policies.128
Louisiana’s rejection of this interpretation affords a unique opportunity to
assess valued policy laws’ impact on fire claim rates. The prior analysis found,
counterintuitively, that states with valued policy laws had lower rates of insurance
claims from fires. This finding would therefore predict that when Louisiana courts
effectively eliminated the state’s valued policy law, fire claim rates would rise. On
the other hand, if policyholders respond as traditionally assumed by moral hazard
theory, Louisiana should enjoy lower fire claim rates after eliminating its valued
policy law.
As an initial inquiry into this question, we can look at Louisiana’s fire claim
rate over time. Figure 4 charts Louisiana’s relative fire rate with the date of the
Landry decision marked. An inspection of Figure 4 suggests that fire claim rates
may have generally increased after the valued policy law effectively ended, which
would be consistent with the results found in the earlier analysis, but which again
runs contrary to moral hazard intuition.
v. Louisiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 721, 744 (La. 2011); see also In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 601 F.Supp. 2d 809, 825 (E.D. La. 2009); Watson v. Allstate
Ins. Co., No. 07-3462, 2009 WL 1704730, at *3 (E.D. La. June 17, 2009); Hibbets v.
Lexington Ins. Co., No. 07-5169, 2009 WL 1668505, at *2 (E.D. La. June 12, 2009)
(following the Landry holding); Crescent City Prop. Redevelopment Assoc., LLC v. USAA
Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-11420, 2009 WL 982002, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 2009).
127
Landry, 983 So. 2d at 73–74; see also Frught v. Lafayette Ins. Co., No. 107-245,
2009 WL 7205339 (La. Dist. Ct. 2009) (reproducing State Farm and Allstate testimony that
equated fire policies with homeowners policies).
128
See Caruso v. Allstate, No. 06-2613, 2007 WL 625830, at *10 (E.D. La. Feb. 26,
2006); Landry v. Louisiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 964 So. 2d 463, 483 (La. Ct. App. 2007);
see also Marchman v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 500 S.E.2d 659, 661 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998);
Johnson v. Madelia Lake Crystal Mut. Ins. Co., No. A03-820, 2004 WL 61057, at *5 (Minn.
Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2004); Necaise v. USAA Cas. Co., 644 So. 2d 253, 258 (Miss. 1992); Nat’l
Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey, 425 S.E.2d 754, 757
(S.C. Ct. App. 1992); Adams v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., No. W2009-00931-COAR3-CV, 2010 WL 1444477, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2010); Vail v. Texas Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 137 (Tex. 1988); see generally Mitchell F. Crusto,
Louisiana Valued Policy Law: When Total Loss Equals Total Payment?, 55 LA. BAR J. 87,
88 (2007) (analyzing Louisiana’s valued policy law shortly before the Landry decision,
concluding that Louisiana’s valued policy law “applies to homeowners’ policies unless it is
a specific policy type expressly excluded by the Legislature”).
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Figure 4
Louisiana Fire Claim Rate
Landry decision
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Such a casual analysis is of only limited usefulness, however. What if, for
example, Louisiana unluckily experienced a sustained bout of wildfires following
spring 2008? Or what if Louisiana suffered significant unemployment after the
Landry decision? If policyholders respond to difficult economic times by increasing
their fire loss propensity, then a simple before and after comparison confined to
Louisiana could overstate the real effect of legal change.129 On the other hand, if
Louisiana’s economy by coincidence improved following the Landry decision, then
Figure 4 could understate the impact of the valued policy law change.
Fortunately, a systematic analysis can be conducted by comparing Louisiana’s
fire claim odds to that of comparable states, controlling for various other factors that
might differ among them. This analysis involves calculating the difference in
Louisiana fire claim odds before and after the Landry decision, and comparing that
difference to any difference in other states’ fire claim odds, before and after the date
of the Landry decision. This “difference-in-differences” analysis allows other states
to be used as a control group, so that any relative difference in Louisiana’s
experience compared to the control group’s experience can be attributed to
Louisiana’s valued policy law change.130 This general approach is regularly used in
129

For reasoning along these lines, see supra text accompanying note 107.
For more on the difference-in-differences approach, see JOSHUA D. ANGRIST &
JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S
COMPANION 227–42 (2009).
130
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empirical law and economics studies because of its ability to isolate the effects of
legal change in a broader system.131
We can envision three different collections of states serving as a control group
for Louisiana. The smallest control group that may most closely replicate
nonobservable characteristics of Louisiana consists of Mississippi and Texas—
valued policy law states that border Louisiana and that also share its exposure to
Gulf Coast weather events and other regional trends. The downsides of a small
control group are its potential to be dominated by idiosyncratic peculiarities of one
state, as well as its lack of statistical power. Therefore, a somewhat larger control
group adds in Arkansas, the third valued policy law state bordering Louisiana.
Arkansas, however, does not have Gulf exposure. Finally, the largest group consists
of all states having valued policy laws, yielding a group of the 18 states shaded in
Figure 3 and providing the greatest statistical power; although drawing from areas
of the country that may differ in meaningful ways from Louisiana’s regional
experience.
Table 3 collects the results of the difference-in-differences analysis using these
three different comparison groups. To control for factors that may influence fire
claim rates but that vary by state and time, the analysis includes the factors included
in the cross-sectional regressions presented in Tables 1 and 2, such as housing prices.
The analysis also includes year-month fixed effect variables, to capture the influence
of seasonality on fire rates, and state fixed effect variables, which account for stable
state-specific factors that have a constant influence on fire claim rates over the
sample period, such as cultural differences, characteristics of the state’s housing
stock, and relative concentration of urban versus rural real estate development.
Table 3 reveals a story strikingly similar to that of the cross-section analysis.
That is, after Louisiana ended its valued policy law by judicial decree, the state had
significantly higher odds of any particular insurance claim being due to fire, after
controlling for the potentially relevant factors discussed in the context of Tables 1
and 2.

131

Id. For a recent adaptation of this approach, see Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F.
Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?:
Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 644–63 (2015).
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Table 3
Results of Difference-in-Differences Analysis, Pre- and Post-Landry
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.433***
Difference-in-Differences
0.204***
0.223***
Coefficient Estimate
(0.052)
(0.031)
(0.034)
N

Comparison States

436,354

467,932

1,398,757

Mississippi
Texas

Arkansas
Mississippi
Texas

All Valued
Policy Law
States

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on log-odds of a reported loss
being due to fire or smoke relative to other loss sources. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state-month
level to correct for autocorrelation by state/month combinations over
time. All regressions include state and year-month fixed effects and
control for the non-judicial foreclosure explanatory variables of Tables 1
and 2.

We can also examine whether this difference emerged soon after the Landry
decision or instead at some delayed point following the ruling. This can be done by
repeating the difference-in-differences analysis in a dynamic fashion, calculating
relative fire claim odds for successive discrete periods leading up to and following
the Landry decision. Figure 5 shows the results of this dynamic process, using all
valued policy law states as a control group and calculating relative fire odds for
consecutive twelve-month periods. A pure cause-and-effect relationship between
Louisiana’s change to valued policy laws and policyholder behavior should manifest
as a near-immediate and sustained increase in fire probabilities post-Landry relative
to periods before the decision. An inspection of Figure 5 reveals that apparent
relationship.

2018]

PLAYING WITH FIRE?

383

Figure 5
Dynamic Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Louisiana vs. All Other Valued Policy Law States
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Point estimates correspond to difference-in-differences coefficient estimates for the period ending at the point.

C. Estimating Impact on Property Damage
Both the cross-sectional and difference-in-differences analysis suggest lower
fire claim odds from valued policy laws. With certain assumptions, the estimates
from these analyses can be used to derive approximate estimates for the savings in
residential property damage associated with valued policy laws.
To do so, I begin by estimating the decrease in fire claim probabilities from
valued policy laws. The analyses earlier in this Part derived fire claim odds, rather
than probabilities; fire claim probabilities vary depending on the values of the other
variables. Nevertheless, an approximation of the overall impact on fire claim
probabilities can be derived from odds; Appendix B has additional information on
this process. Doing so, the cross-sectional analysis suggests a 3.2 to 3.6 percentage
point (or 11.5 to 12.8 percent) reduction in fire claim probabilities from valued
policy laws.
With some additional estimates and additional assumptions, it is then possible
to derive the economic impact of valued policy laws. The National Fire Protection
Association, using data provided from fire departments around the nation, estimates
annual direct residential property damage to be $6.7 billion nationally. 132 If we
132

MARTY AHRENS, NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASSOC., HOME STRUCTURE FIRES 1 (2017).
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assume that valued policy laws’ decrease in fire claim probabilities is due to an
equivalent decrease in fire claim rates—that, for instance, the cross-sectional
analysis’s reduction in fire claim probabilities is not due to an uncontrolled increase
in burglary, theft, vandalism, or personal property destruction—and that the
decrease is distributed uniformly across fire severities, property damage estimates
can then be derived.
The value of residential housing in the country can be estimated by summing
the product of each state’s housing units133 and average home price134 for 2010, the
latest year of available data. Dividing the direct residential property damage estimate
by this number shows that approximately 0.03% of residential property is damaged
by fire each year. Multiplying this resulting number by the value of residential
property in valued policy law states, and taking 11.5% or 12.8% of the resulting
number to reflect the average decrease in fire rates from valued policy laws, yields
an estimate range of $237 million to $264 million in annual residential property
damage savings in states that have valued policy laws.
Again, these estimates are subject to a number of strong assumptions. But given
these figures, it is natural to consider whether enacting valued policy laws would
promote significant annual savings. Although the decrease in direct economic
damage to residential property would be appealing, valued policy laws may bring
their own offsetting costs, which this Article considers briefly in Part V. Moreover,
for valued policy laws to promote savings, it must be the case that valued policy
laws cause changes in fire loss claim odds, which I consider next.
D. Causation?
Both the cross-sectional and difference-in-differences analysis suggest a
surprising association between nominally moral hazard-enhancing valued policy
laws, and a decrease in fire loss claims. Is it possible to draw a causative link between
this association?
Outside the controlled experiment environment, it is notoriously difficult to do
so.135 Effects that appear causative may instead be due to unobserved characteristics
that can eliminate the proposed causation chain or even reverse it entirely. 136
Applied to this Article’s findings, perhaps states that adopt valued policy laws do so
because, for unobservable reasons, their citizens are relatively resistant to moral
hazard, which would maximize the benefits of these laws while minimizing the
133

See U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of Housing Units for the United States
and States: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014, (May 2015), http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/
table/1.0/en/PEP/2014/PEPANNHU [https://perma.cc/9Y8C-RLLM].
134
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, House Price Index Datasets, http://www.fhfa.gov/Data
Tools/Downloads/Pages/House-Price-Index-Datasets.aspx [https://perma.cc/K2ND-88MJ]
(last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
135
See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 130, at 11.
136
See, e.g., Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the
Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 625, 643 (2015) (describing the problems
associated with the particular case of biased sample selection).
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downsides. This situation could explain the finding of lower fire rates in states with
valued policy laws without these laws causing lower fire rates.
This concern may be dismissed for two reasons. First, as the difference-indifferences analysis reveals, an unexpected change in the law is associated with a
change in behavior. Because the change was unexpected and apparently unprovoked,
Louisiana’s experience closely mimics the virtues of the controlled experiment
environment—with the added benefit of observing behavior in the real world.
Nevertheless, if the unexpected judicial change happened to coincide with an
unobserved change in Louisiana at approximately the same time, the causative
conclusion could still be undermined.
Second, the cross-section analysis, while not necessarily analyzing a random
assignment of laws, also benefits from many of the virtues of a controlled
experiment. Most states’ positions on valued policy laws were determined decades
ago;137 for many, the laws were originally passed in the 1800s.138 It seems unlikely
that any meaningful unobservable differences that existed a century ago and led to
the adoption of these laws would persist to the present day. Moreover, any factors
that do stand this test of time might be expected to continue, in which case they
would be captured by the fixed effects variables included in the cross-section
analysis of Tables 1 and 2. The cross-section comparison would suffer only from
some unobservable element that changed during the sample period proportionately
more for states with (or without) valued policy laws. This is not to say that such an
event could not happen, but the probability of its doing so seems rather small.
None of this is to say that causation can be definitively established when relying
on natural world events and actual individual behavior, as this study does.
Nevertheless, the consistent results between the two independent tests should
assuage most causative concerns that commonly afflict studies outside the controlled
laboratory environment. And the advantage of relying on real world events is that
the study rests on the actual behavior of real individuals making meaningful life
decisions, rather than the results reported from a more sterile laboratory environment.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The empirical findings described in the preceding part have several useful
implications. The following subparts explore implications for states’ valued policy
laws, and for modeling how individuals and other players respond to financial
incentives.

137

See, e.g., STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 66, § 15.04[B] at 15-74 (“[M]ost states
with valued policy laws enacted them during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.”); see also HAYDEN’S ANNUAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 72, at 619–24
(identifying 19 states with valued policy laws in 1900).
138
HAYDEN’S ANNUAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 72, at 619–24 (identifying 19 states
with valued policy laws in 1900); see generally MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-13-5 (2013) (valued
policy enacted in 1936 and unchanged since then).
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A. Implications for Valued Policy Laws
Although valued policy laws were first passed over 100 years ago, the debate
on their relative costs and benefits remains unsettled today. Even now, states
continue to abandon and readopt valued policy laws with surprising frequency, while
others consider their adoption for the first time.139
A significant reason for this regulatory oscillation no doubt stems from the lack
of consensus over valued policy laws’ benefits and their costs. While there may be
reason independent of this Article’s analysis to doubt valued policy laws’ benefits,140
this analysis shows that any costs from an increase in moral hazard and fire rates
may be insignificant. To be sure, moral hazard is not the sole downside of valued
policy laws, 141 but it is the concern most commonly identified by these laws’
critics.142 And if the costs of these laws are less than traditionally assumed while
everything else remains equal, the overall desirability of valued policy laws
increases. In that case, a better case for valued policy laws could be made.
However, it seems unlikely that everything else is remaining equal. Explaining
how valued policy laws apparently reduce fire rates without something else also
changing is exceptionally difficult. After all, it is undisputed that, everything else
equal, valued policy laws provide greater economic incentives for both intentional
139

See, e.g., Landry v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 983 So. 2d 66, 77 (La. 2008)
(describing Louisiana’s 1988 repeal and subsequent 1991 reenactment of valued policy law);
Seider v. O’Connell, 612 N.W.2d 659, 664 (Wis. 2000) (describing Wisconsin’s 1975 repeal
and subsequent 1979 reenactment of valued policy law); Aldo Svaldi, Fires Reignite Debate
over Valued Policies in Colorado, DENVER POST (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.denverpost.
com/ci_21968732/fires-reignite-debate-over-valued-policies-colorado [https://perma.cc/H6
KU-TN8A] (describing legislative attempts in Colorado to pass valued policy law).
140
In particular, competitive property insurance markets seemingly solve many of the
problems valued policy laws are designed to fix. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability
Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389,
1405, 1460–63 (2006) (collecting evidence on price competitiveness). For example, in states
without valued policy laws, market forces would push insurers’ pricing models so that any
overinsurance from a policy’s face value exceeding property value does not increase
insurance premiums.
141
For example, valued policy laws make it more expensive—and perhaps more
difficult—for policyholders to obtain a policy whose face value exceeds replacement costs
or actual cash value. Rational policyholders may want such a policy to insure against
unexpectedly high replacement costs or property value, which may occur not only because
these costs cannot be estimated with exact precision, but also because market forces may
render labor or materials unexpectedly expensive at the time of loss, which increases both
replacement costs and actual cash value. See, e.g., Elliot Spagat, Insurance Calculator
Questioned: Homeowners Discover Coverage Was Insufficient, WASH. POST (July 24, 2004),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9509-2004Jul23.html [https://perma.cc/
D3QQ-DCPH] (interviewing insurance representatives who note that estimating housing
values is “not an exact science” and that “replacement costs tend to skyrocket after major
disasters.”).
142
See supra text accompanying notes 74–78.
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and unintentional residential fires than their nonvalued counterparts. To explain the
contradictory finding seemingly requires something else to be changing coincident
with the presence of valued policy laws.
Two likely candidates readily emerge. First, it could be that policyholders do
not respond to economic incentives in traditional ways, such that the appearance of
valued policy laws causes them to reduce their fire proclivities. Or second, it could
be that insurers react to valued policy laws by changing their behavior in a way that
ultimately reduces fire rates. I consider each in turn.
1. Do Policyholders Act Differently?
The first path to a full understanding of the connection between valued policy
laws and fire rates involves examining the link between economic incentives and
policyholder behavior. A policyholder is always compensated at least as generously
in a valued policy law state as she is with a comparable insurance policy in a
nonvalued policy law state;143 a policyholder who reacts rationally to these financial
incentives will therefore have higher fire rates. But nothing requires policyholders
to actually respond to these financial incentives in accordance with economic theory.
So, perhaps the presence of a valued policy law somehow leads policyholders to lash
out against financial incentives, thereby lowering fire rates.
Such a conclusion is difficult to draw, but perhaps not impossible. If, for
instance, policyholders viewed valued policy laws as also imposing a noneconomic
obligation to resist moral hazard, this noneconomic obligation could outweigh any
economic incentives for fire that valued policy laws provide. 144 There is little
evidence to support this view, however; in fact, many policyholders seem
disturbingly pleased by imposing questionable losses on insurance companies.145
Moreover, there is little evidence that policyholders are even aware of whether their
policies are governed by valued policy laws,146 in which case we cannot tie a legal
rule to a behavior change by policyholders. Explaining the empirical findings via a
direct policyholder response to valued policy laws is therefore not promising.

143

See supra text accompanying notes 65–67.
For additional discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 135–138; see
generally Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2000)
(finding non-monetary disincentives outweighed subsequent monetary penalties). Or,
perhaps states with especially moral citizens are more likely to adopt valued policy laws,
because their populations render these laws’ downsides relatively unimportant, although the
age of these laws and Louisiana’s unexpected change make this explanation unlikely.
145
See generally TOBIAS, supra note 31 (discussing several instances of this behavior).
146
See supra text accompanying note 95; NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS,
HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE SURVEY 1 (2007), http://www.naic.org/documents/
newsroom_homeowners_insurance_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/92V8-CDYK] (finding
low awareness among policyholders for several fundamental terms of standard homeowners
insurance contract).
144
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However, policyholder behavior may still be indirectly tied to valued policy
laws if some intervening entity reacts to the laws by sending a signal to which
policyholders are responsive. Insurance companies are one likely candidate.
2. Do Insurers Act Differently?
The second path assumes that insurers change their behavior in response to
valued policy laws in a way that ultimately reduces policyholder loss rates. Since
claims for total losses are at least as costly to insurers in valued policy law states as
comparable claims in other states, insurers in valued policy law states should take
greater steps to mitigate these losses, thereby reducing the amount they need to pay
out.
Insurers might do so through reducing the probability that a fire occurs, such as
by providing more loss-prevention education to policyholders. Yet these efforts are
an inefficient way for insurers to achieve their desired goal. Valued policy laws
require insurers to pay more only if the property is overinsured; insurers pay the
same when homes are insured for amounts less than or equal to their value. Insurers
in valued policy law states therefore care most about deterring fires for overinsured
homes. Since the percentage of homes that are overinsured is low,147 most of an
insurer’s extra fire prevention measures would therefore be wasted.148
Insurers might also prosecute fraud with greater intensity in valued policy law
states. Intentional losses are excluded from coverage,149 and insurers have a stronger
incentive to deny claims in valued policy states, where an overinsured claim will be
more costly. For this action to explain the findings, potential arsonists must be
deterred by the increased prosecution risk, which requires policyholder knowledge
of the increased fraud prosecution potential. Criminal deterrence literature in other
areas suggests this condition is possible, but unlikely.150
Insurers could also respond by reducing their cost once a fire happens, such as
by issuing insurance policies with lower limits. This explanation is more promising.
If insurers know they must pay out full policy face value whenever a total loss occurs
in a valued policy law state, they have the incentive to issue fewer “inflated”
147

See California Wildfires, supra note 40 (finding a significant number of homes are
underinsured).
148
Or, more accurately, the benefits to an insurer from general fire prevention are
largely the same regardless of whether the state has a valued policy law, so the insurer should
not meaningfully alter its practices based on the law, which fails to explain the empirical
findings.
149
See supra text accompanying note 52. They might also prosecute fraud with greater
intensity, since intentional losses are excluded from coverage. However, more intense fraud
prosecution would not result in the observed lower fire rates in valued policy law states
unless potential arsonists are deterred by the increased prosecution risk, which requires
policyholder knowledge of the increased fraud prosecution potential.
150
See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 173 (2004) (arguing that
criminal law has little deterrence effect because of low awareness, among other reasons).
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insurance policies and to reduce the amount by which those policies are inflated.
This means that on average, insurers will issue policies with lower limits in valued
policy law states. 151 This fact, combined with an assumption that policyholder
behavior is responsive to the gap between insurance values and home prices, can
then explain the empirical finding that valued policy law states have lower fire claim
probabilities. Insurance policies in valued policy law states have lower limits than
policies for comparable homes in nonvalued policy states, leading to lower
policyholder moral hazard and therefore lower fire rates in valued policy law states.
This explanation is intuitively attractive, and the earlier empirical tests provide
some evidence to support it. As Tables 1 and 2 show, to the extent policyholders are
responsive to overinsurance, it is generally in the direction that the prior paragraph
predicted. That is, a decrease in home prices, and an increase in what is popularly
believed to be overinsurance, generally increases the probability of fire loss claims.
While the relationship is not as systematically statistically significant as one might
hope, it is robust to a variety of alternative home price specifications as shown in the
Appendix.
If there were evidence that insurers actually issued lower policy amounts in
valued policy law states, then this argument would be even better. Unfortunately,
data on private insurers’ operations are notoriously difficult to assemble. 152
Although valued policy law proponents assume insurers may act this way,153 this
Article has already shown the problems that can result from conventional
assumptions in insurance markets. More evidence is needed before drawing a firm
conclusion on the causal mechanism.
A disparate response by insurers in valued policy states is not the only
assumption required by this explanation. It must also be the case that policyholders
do not fully understand their policies, so that “overinsurance”154—where the policy
face value exceeds the house value or replacement cost—exacerbates moral hazard
in both valued and nonvalued policy states. As was discussed in Part I, outside of
valued policy law states, insurers pay the lesser of the value of destroyed property
or the policy face value.155 Therefore, in nonvalued policy law states, overinsurance
should have minimal effect on rational moral hazard, because the policyholder is not
paid the excess policy value in the event of overinsurance. Only if policyholders do
not understand this contractual term will a change in insurer pricing practices
produce a change in policyholder behavior. While such an assumption may not be
151

See supra text accompanying notes 79–80. Valued policy law advocates have hoped
that these lower limits will also more accurately reflect home prices.
152
Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency
in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 413–35 (2014) (identifying the
lack of transparency in property/casualty insurance).
153
See supra text accompanying notes 79–80.
154
The focus here is on overinsurance; if insurers did not overinsure homes, then there
would be no financial reason for them to reduce policy amounts in valued policy law states,
because insurer payouts are the same regardless of state when policy amounts do not exceed
dwelling values.
155
See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
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unwarranted—even experts sometimes assume overinsured policyholders are
always paid the policy face value156 —it should be more rigorously tested before
being accepted.
Notably, an explanation that focuses on insurer behavior, rather than
policyholder behavior, as the direct response to the presence or absence of a valued
policy law does not require that homeowners have knowledge of their state’s laws,
nor does it require that Louisiana policyholders know when their laws change. This
is helpful, as it is unlikely that most policyholders understand the finer minutiae of
insurance law, let alone have knowledge of when these minutiae change. Indeed, the
public’s comprehension of legal rules is already low in a variety of contexts outside
of technical heavy insurance law. 157 What this explanation does require is that
insurers understand the legal playing field and price their policies accordingly, with
these price signals transmitted to policyholders who then act accordingly. An
assumption that insurers, instead of policyholders, are aware of the legal system and
that policyholders are responsive to highly salient premiums is far more palatable.158
Note also that if insurers respond to valued policy laws by reducing insurance
policy face values, then new, substantial, and unexpected costs may be introduced
because of valued policy laws, offsetting some or all the fire loss savings. 159 If
insurers respond to valued policy laws by reducing policy limits below levels needed
to replace destroyed homes, then policyholders in these states suffer by being
underinsured in the event of a loss.160 Although typical insurer practices are usually
assumed to incentivize writing policies with higher face values and therefore higher
premiums and profits,161 in valued policy law states it may be worth trading off some
premium income for the lower loss rates, and lower payouts in the event of a loss,
that can be achieved by reducing policy limits. The reduction in moral hazard in

156
See, e.g., TOBIAS, supra note 31, at 107 (suggesting a money-making opportunity
by burning down overinsured homes).
157
See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 150, at 176 (stating the general population
“rarely know[s] the criminal law rules.”).
158
See generally PROP. CAS. INS. ASS’N OF AM., supra note 21 (arguing that adopting
valued policy laws in Colorado would increase insurance premiums). For example, insurers
are quick to respond when states consider adopting valued policy laws. Policyholders are
also routinely assumed to respond to premium prices, which arguably is the most salient term
of an insurance contract. Schwarcz, supra note 51, at 1266 (asserting that policyholders’
purchase decision is “based almost exclusively on price, service, and general reputation.”).
See generally Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003) (arguing that with standard form contracts
like insurance policies, consumers care about only a limited number of highly salient terms,
such as price).
159
Other potential responses by insurers, such as educating policyholders about fire
prevention or prosecuting fraud more strongly, would also introduce costs.
160
California Wildfires, supra note 40 (finding a significant number of homes to be
underinsured).
161
See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 78, at 142 (noting that one potential benefit of valued
policy laws is their deterrent against writing excessive insurance policies).
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valued policy law states, then, can come at the expense of new and unanticipated
costs, which may be more severe than the moral hazard costs initially contemplated.
A focus on insurer behavior also reveals why insurers likely resist the
introduction of valued policy laws so forcefully. Whether insurers respond by
reducing the insurance amount, or by providing more fire-prevention education, or
by prosecuting fraud more vigorously, the result to insurers will be the same: valued
policy laws will impose new costs. If insurers pass these costs along through more
expensive premiums, the size of the insurance market shrinks along with profit
opportunities; if insurers instead absorb these costs, profits diminish.162 Either way,
insurers have reason to avoid valued policy laws.163
3. Does Some Other Entity Act Differently?
The prior subparts analyzed how to explain the empirical results by changes in
either policyholder or insurer behavior in response to valued policy laws. What about
someone else beyond these two sets of players?
Although there is no evidence that other entities act differently because of
valued policy laws, it is useful to consider the complete range of actors when
attempting to explain the empirical results. Perhaps insurance regulators in valued
policy law states are particularly likely to implement measures to combat moral
hazard of their own, for example. Analyzing a full set of actors not only provides
useful insight into how the link between valued policy laws and loss rates might
emerge, but also opens up future avenues of research. It may be worth separately
analyzing how other actors like insurance fraud bureaus, regulators, courts, or others
could contribute to the observed findings if their behavior were systematically
different when confronted with valued policy laws.
B. Implications for Modeling Behavior
The prior sections illuminated implications for valued policy laws by
considering how these laws might change the behavior not only of policyholders (in
surprising ways), but also of insurers and others. These findings have more
generalized useful implications for modeling behavior, which should produce more
accurate assessments of insurance regulation’s costs and benefits.

162

Although these actions will also reduce insurers’ expenses via lower fire rates,
insurers should already adopt loss-prevention techniques in non-valued policy law states if
the value from reduced expenses more than offset the costs. Any new insurer action as a
result of valued policy laws will therefore be driven solely by the desire to offset increased
costs from valued policy laws to insurers. Insurers would be better off without undertaking
valued policy laws’ burden and their attempts to avoid that burden.
163
It could also be that insurers resist valued policy laws if they view the law as an
excuse to impose more substantial regulatory burdens in the future.
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Insurance regulation has long relied on an assumption that individuals respond
predictably to financial incentives.164 If a behavior is made more expensive, then
policyholders should be less likely to engage in it. This assumption fuels regulatory
efforts in a variety of insurance markets, including specifically homeowners
insurance, the domain of this study.165
This Article joins the increasing body of work that questions such a simple
application of rational economic models to actual policyholder behavior. 166
Policyholders seemingly violate classical economic predictions by decreasing fire
loss rates when financial incentives for them increase via valued policy laws; by
showing responsiveness to housing price changes when those changes have no
economic role in determining insurance payouts; and by not showing sensitivity to
replacement costs, the mortgage foreclosure process, or other economic indicators,
all of which do impact the costs and benefits of rational economic decision making.
While these findings need not imply that policyholders are irrational, they do show
that other, unconsidered players like insurance companies may also alter their
practices in response to regulation, producing surprising behavior by policyholders
at the end of the causal chain.
One of the challenges when studying a specific behavior is to produce
conclusions that can be generalized to broader circumstances. This study is no
different. Although understanding policyholder behavior in the context of fire losses
and homeowners insurance has considerable importance of its own, deriving broader
conclusions could extend this importance still further.
We can draw some tentative broader lessons apart from the obvious admonition
of being careful to consider how theoretical incentives might play out in practice.
This Article shows that a full appreciation of policyholder response to regulation
depends not only on understanding of policyholder costs and benefits, but also on
the ways that other actors like insurers may alter their practices, in turn shaping the
incentives policyholders see. For example, insurance companies may change their
underwriting practices in response to valued policy laws in a way that entirely
eliminates any increase in policyholder-level moral hazard that the laws would
otherwise add. Understanding this interaction will increase the chance that future
predictions from theoretical models will align with reality, improving the
effectiveness of insurance regulatory design.
In addition to that lesson, this Article highlights how moral hazard in particular,
and individual behavior in general, depends not so much on the actual economic
incentives that exist, but more importantly on what individuals perceive those
economic incentives to be. Other than the presence of valued policy laws, the next
most significant driver of policyholder behavior appears to be recent changes in
164

See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 213–28 (2012).
165
See id. at 223–25.
166
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 24 (citing work by Tom Baker). See
generally HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., INSURANCE & BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS:
IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY 51–162 (2013) (reviewing
selected insurance market phenomena from a behavioral perspective).
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housing prices. Although housing price changes do not, as an economic matter,
affect homeowners’ insurance payment, the factor is commonly believed to do so.
And at the end of the day, only those factors that individuals believe matter, and
which they by extension incorporate into their decision making, will affect behavior.
This implies that insurance law and policy can be important regulators of
behavior, but only to the extent that they carry over into individual beliefs and
decision making. Sometimes that carryover can be indirect: for example, practices
that affect insurers’ premium prices, such as premium discounts for safe behavior,
can end up impacting individual behavior even if individuals are not directly aware
of those practices.167 But in other instances, making individuals aware of alreadyexisting systems might be a more effective means of regulating behavior than
enacting new rules. Educating policyholders about fire prevention and the inability
to profit from losses in nonvalued policy law states, for example, might be more
effective at deterring losses than enacting a valued policy law.
Grappling with individual beliefs adds a complicating layer on top of what is
often already a difficult regulatory framework. To take the case of moral hazard,
Part I showed that several factors will influence its prevalence. These factors need
not all weigh in the same direction, making a theoretical assessment of moral
hazard’s severity a difficult and imprecise exercise. In homeowners insurance, some
factors weigh strongly in favor of moral hazard, while others do not, leaving a
muddled picture of the problem’s severity. 168 Yet now an understanding of
individual beliefs must be grafted onto this model, because without knowing how
individuals interpret the relevant costs and benefits of a decision, it can become an
exercise in futility to determine appropriate regulatory policy.169 Although surveys
and similar tools have eased the difficulty in determining these beliefs empirically,
policymakers seem slow to adopt them so far.170
CONCLUSION
Moral hazard in insurance markets is a primary concern of regulators and
insurers, yet accurately predicting how the theoretical phenomenon plays out in the
real world remains a challenging exercise. This Article adds to our understanding by
showing empirically that policyholders react to valued policy laws in the opposite
way that moral hazard theory predicts. Although the causal link’s precise contours
cannot be known without further exploration, this study nevertheless offers useful
information not only for appropriately setting state homeowners insurance
167

See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 164, at 202. Even these policies require at least
some awareness by policyholders—while they need not know the nuances of the particular
policy, they must know that a premium discount exists for safe behavior.
168
See supra text accompanying notes 37–48.
169
See Peter Molk & Arden Rowell, Reregulation and the Regulatory Timeline, 101
IOWA L. REV. 1497, 1501–12 (2016) (examining the effects when these regulatory
approaches culminate in oscillating regulatory policies).
170
See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 140, at 1463 (urging increased regulatory oversight
of insurance contracts based on “investigat[ing] competing empirical considerations”).
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regulatory policy, but also for updating the rational economic actor model to fit
better the information that individuals actually incorporate into their decision
making.
APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY
Cross-Sectional Comparison Specification. When analyzing whether valued
policy laws are associated with a change in homeowner fire rates, I estimate the
following specification at the claim level:
𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚&,(,) = 𝛼 + 𝜃) + 𝜇( + 𝛾(,) + 𝛽2 𝑋(,) + 𝜀&,(,)

(1)

where i indexes claims, s and t denote the state (or region, depending on the model
being estimated) and year-month of claim i, and 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚&,(,) is an indicator variable
that takes the value of 1 if claim i is due to fire or smoke, and 0 otherwise. Yearmonth fixed effects for the date of the claim are specified by 𝜃) to incorporate
nationwide fixed differences in fire rates across year-month combinations. State or
region fixed effects, depending on the model being estimated, are specified by 𝜇( to
incorporate localized fixed differences in fire rates for the entire sample. State or
region yearly fixed effects, depending on the model being estimated, are specified
by 𝛾(,) to incorporate localized fixed differences in fire rates that vary by year. 𝑋(,)
is a vector of variables, consisting of indicator variables that specify whether the
state has a valued policy law and that describe the foreclosure process, and timevarying nonindicator covariates specific to each state including the percentage
change in construction costs, the percentage change in housing prices, the
percentage change in income per capita, the log of the unemployment rate, the log
of the housing vacancy rate, the monthly precipitation for that state, and an indicator
variable specifying whether that monthly precipitation amount falls within the
bottom 10% of all monthly precipitation numbers. Because the existence of a valued
policy law and the foreclosure process are (except for Louisiana) invariant over the
time period under analysis, valued policy law and foreclosure indicator variables are
included only for those models without state fixed effects; models specifying state
fixed effects will subsume these variables within the state fixed effects estimates.
Basic Difference-in-Differences Specification. When analyzing the basic effect
of Louisiana’s valued policy law elimination on fire claims, I estimate the following
specification at the claim level:
𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚&,(,) = 𝛼 + 𝜃) + 𝜇( + 𝛽5 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡& ∗ 𝐿𝐴& ) + 𝛽2 𝑋(,) + 𝜀&,(,)

(2)

where i indexes claims, s and t denote the state and year-month of claim i, and
𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚&,(,) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if claim i is due to fire or
smoke, and 0 otherwise. Year-month fixed effects for the date of the claim are
specified by 𝜃) to incorporate fixed nationwide differences in fire rates across yearmonth combinations, while state fixed effects are specified by 𝜇( to incorporate
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fixed differences in fire rates across states. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡& is an indicator variable for whether
claim i occurred on or after May 21, 2008. 𝐿𝐴& is an indicator variable specifying
whether claim i comes from Louisiana. 𝑋(,) is a vector of variables, consisting of
indicator variables describing the state’s foreclosure process and time-varying
covariates specific to each state including the percentage change in construction
costs, the percentage change in housing prices, the percentage change in income per
capita, the log of the monthly unemployment rate, the log of the monthly housing
vacancy rate, the monthly precipitation for that state, and an indicator variable
specifying whether that monthly precipitation amount falls within the bottom 10%
of all monthly precipitation numbers.
𝛽5 is the coefficient of interest, representing the extent to which Louisiana’s
abrogation of its valued policy law is associated with differential odds of a claim
being due to fire. Positive estimates suggest that eliminating the valued policy law
increases the odds of a particular claim’s cause being fire, holding other factors
constant and assuming no unobservable variations in claim activity that are
correlated with Louisiana’s post-Landry time period.
Dynamic Difference-in-Differences Specification. When analyzing how
Louisiana’s relative fire claim odds vary on a yearly basis, I estimate the following
specification at the claim level:

2B55

𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚&,(,) = 𝛼 + 𝜃) + 𝜇( + ? 𝛽@ (𝑑) ∗ 𝐿𝐴& ) + 𝛽EFG (𝑝𝑟𝑒& ∗ 𝐿𝐴& )
@C2BBD

+𝛽EK() (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡& ∗ 𝐿𝐴& ) + 𝛽2 𝑋(,) + 𝜀&,(,)

(3)

where 𝑑&,) is an indicator variable for whether claim i falls within the twelve-month
period ending May 20 of year j (chosen to correspond with the Landry decision
issued May 21, 2008), 𝑝𝑟𝑒& is an indicator variable for whether claim i falls within
the residual sample period preceding May 21, 2002 (namely, January 1 through May
20 2002), and 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡& is an indicator variable for whether claim i falls within the
residual sample period following May 20, 2011 (May 21 through December 31
2011), with other variables as specified in the basic difference-in-differences
specification. 𝛽@ , 𝛽EFG , and 𝛽EK() are the variables of interest, indicating Louisiana’s
relative odds of a claim’s being due to fire or smoke for each twelve month period
(or shorter, in the case of the pre- and postperiod residuals.)

396

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, ROBUSTNESS TESTS
The Figures below subject the findings in the main text to a series of alternative
specifications to gauge the sensitivity of the results to the specifications presented
in the main text.
Cross-Sectional Comparison Results
Table 1 in the main text presented the impact on log odds for states with and
without valued policy laws, among other variables. To get a sense for the change in
fire claim probabilities, rather than fire claim odds, Table A1 calculates the marginal
effects for valued policy laws for both Models (1) and (2) of Table 1. The marginal
impacts are calculated holding all other variables at their means.
Table A1
Marginal Effects of Valued Policy Law for Cross-Sectional Regression
(1)
(2)
Non-Valued Policy Law States
28.1%
27.8%
Valued Policy Law States
24.5%
24.6%
Estimates report the predicted probability of a claim being a fire or
smoke claim, using the estimates from Models (1) and (2) of Table 1
and holding other values at their means.

Table 1 in the main text also used a twelve-month window for the housing price
and construction cost price changes. Tables A2 and A3 replicate the analysis of the
first two models in Table 1, varying the length of time over which the housing price
and construction cost indexes are measured.

2018]

PLAYING WITH FIRE?

397

Table A2
Robustness Test of Table 1, Model (1), Varying Time Indexes
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
--------------Total Sample-------------1 mo.
Valued Policy Law
Construction Cost Change

3 mo.

6 mo.

12 mo.

-0.186** -0.183** -0.189** -0.184**
(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.082)

0.008

0.022*

-0.016

(0.081)
-0.000

(0.008)

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.012)

Housing Price
Change

-0.049

-0.017

-0.014

-0.014***

(0.066)

(0.026)

(0.013)

(0.005)

Income per Capita Growth
Rate (12 month)

-0.001

-0.001

0.002

0.009

(0.016)

(0.017)

(0.017)

(0.013)

Unemployment
Rate (Log)

-0.025

-0.030

-0.056

-0.126

(0.125)

(0.127)

(0.128)

(0.129)

Housing Vacancy
Rate (Log)
Precipitation (monthly
inches)
Precipitation (extreme
dummy)
Foreclosure Terms
Deficiency: Most
Borrower Friendly
Deficiency: Med.
Borrower Friendly
Deficiency: Least
Borrower Friendly
Nonjudicial
Foreclosure
Redemption
Right Allowed
N

-0.250** -0.252** -0.266*** -0.322***
(0.103)

(0.109)

(0.103)

(0.086)

-0.024

-0.024

-0.023

-0.022

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.015)

(0.015)

0.179**

0.186**

0.175**

0.175**

(0.086)

(0.090)

(0.082)

(0.080)

-0.005
(0.145)
0.076
(0.167)
0.033
(0.162)
-0.054
(0.084)
-0.042
(0.085)

-0.008
(0.144)
0.077
(0.168)
0.031
(0.162)
-0.054
(0.084)
-0.036
(0.084)

-0.008
(0.145)
0.084
(0.166)
0.038
(0.161)
-0.057
(0.083)
-0.049
(0.083)

-0.030
(0.143)
0.097
(0.160)
0.038
(0.158)
-0.063
(0.083)
-0.040
(0.083)

4,078,284 4,078,284 4,078,284 4,078,284

Region Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Region-Year Fixed Effects

N

N

N

N

Year-Month Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on log-odds of a reported
loss being due to fire or smoke versus other loss sources. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
state-month level to correct for autocorrelation by state/month
combinations over time.
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Table A3
Robustness Test of Table 1, Model (2), Varying Time Indexes
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
--------------Total Sample-------------1 mo.
Valued Policy Law
Construction Cost Change

3 mo.

6 mo.

12 mo.

-0.164** -0.162** -0.167** -0.167**
(0.079)

(0.079)

(0.079)

0.007

0.019

-0.022*

(0.078)
-0.007

(0.007)

(0.012)

(0.013)

(0.011)

Housing Price
Change

0.005

0.008

0.004

-0.001

(0.044)

(0.022)

(0.014)

(0.006)

Income per Capita Growth
Rate (12 month)

-0.003

-0.004

-0.006

-0.003

(0.010)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.012)

Unemployment
Rate (Log)

0.009

0.015

0.014

0.000

(0.150)

(0.152)

(0.156)

(0.162)

Housing Vacancy
Rate (Log)
Precipitation (monthly
inches)
Precipitation (monthly
extreme)
Foreclosure Terms
Deficiency: Most
Borrower Friendly
Deficiency: Med.
Borrower Friendly
Deficiency: Least
Borrower Friendly
Nonjudicial
Foreclosure
Redemption
Right Allowed
N

-0.290*** -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.297***
(0.087)

(0.088)

(0.086)

(0.080)

-0.017

-0.018

-0.017

-0.017

(0.012)

(0.012)

(0.012)

(0.012)

0.170**

0.174**

0.161**

0.173**

(0.075)

(0.079)

(0.069)

(0.074)

-0.036
(0.133)
0.084
(0.159)
0.024
(0.152)
-0.063
(0.081)
-0.035
(0.082)

-0.034
(0.132)
0.080
(0.160)
0.021
(0.153)
-0.062
(0.081)
-0.030
(0.082)

-0.027
(0.134)
0.085
(0.159)
0.030
(0.152)
-0.064
(0.081)
-0.044
(0.081)

-0.035
(0.135)
0.088
(0.159)
0.030
(0.152)
-0.065
(0.081)
-0.041
(0.080)

4,078,284 4,078,284 4,078,284 4,078,284

Region Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Region-Year Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year-Month Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on log-odds of a reported
loss being due to fire or smoke versus other loss sources. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
state-month level to correct for autocorrelation by state/month
combinations over time.
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I also replicated the analysis of Tables 1 and 2 using a linear regression, with
the monthly number of reported fire and smoke claims per 100,000 housing units as
the dependent variable, as an additional robustness test of valued policy laws’ impact.
Tables A4 and A5 present the results. The main variable of interest—the impact
from valued policy laws—is in the same direction as the logit models in the main
text, although the estimate is not statistically significant from zero. Since insurers
voluntarily choose to report to the database, and voluntarily choose how many
claims to report, the comprehensiveness of insurer claims reporting may vary from
month to month and state to state. Indeed, Figure 1’s apparent spike in claims in
2006 shows that there might be significant variance. As a consequence, monthly
claims per housing unit represents a noisier dependent variable specification than
the logit models used in the main text. Monthly housing units were computed from
the annual Census figures,171 assuming linear changes from one month to the next.
Because monthly numbers do not perfectly coincide with Louisiana’s law change
(on May 21, 2008), Louisiana’s law change was treated as occurring on June 1, 2008
for purposes of Tables A4 and A5. The results are slightly stronger if the change is
treated as occurring May 21, with the May 2008 claims converted into two separate
monthly figures (from May 1 through May 20, inflating the per housing unit fire
claim number by 31/20, and from May 21 through May 31, inflating the per housing
unit number by 31/11), as shown in Tables A6 and A7.

171

U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Units Intercensal Tables, (Oct. 2012),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/intercensal-2000-2010housing-units.html [https://perma.cc/PA3P-2RML]; U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 133.
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Table A4
Robustness Test of Table 1, Using Monthly Fire Claims per 100,000 Households
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
--------------Total Sample-------------Valued Policy Law
Construction Cost Change
(12 month)

-1.344

-1.305

(0.818)

(0.828)

0.041

0.090

0.048

(0.074)

0.188

(0.093)

(0.072)

(0.119)

Housing Price
Change (12 month)

0.029

0.036

0.022

0.138**

(0.036)

(0.031)

(0.034)

(0.070)

Income per Capita Growth
Rate (12 month)

-0.011

-0.151**

0.018

-0.212*

(0.045)

(0.072)

(0.049)

(0.108)

Unemployment
Rate (Log)

1.293

1.765

-0.163

0.273

(1.099)

(1.142)

(0.975)

(1.728)

0.075

-0.213

0.393

-0.687

(0.645)

(0.625)

(0.613)

(0.580)

-0.054

-0.084

-0.092

-0.107

(0.076)

(0.083)

(0.068)

(0.091)

-0.121

0.039

-0.206

-0.091

(0.737)

(0.700)

(0.608)

(0.651)

Housing Vacancy
Rate (Log)
Precipitation (monthly
inches)
Precipitaiton (monthly
extreme)
Foreclosure Terms
Deficiency: Most
Borrower Friendly
Deficiency: Med.
Borrower Friendly
Deficiency: Least
Borrower Friendly
Nonjudicial
Foreclosure
Redemption
Right Allowed
N

1.026*
1.033*
(0.561)
(0.581)
1.692*** 1.678***
(0.532)
(0.524)
0.981
1.032
(0.889)
(0.871)
0.534
0.472
(0.686)
(0.680)
0.632
0.613
(0.521)
(0.507)
5,876

5,876

5,876

5,876

Region Fixed Effects

Y

Y

N

N

Region-Year Fixed Effects

N

Y

N

N

State Fixed Effects

N

N

Y

Y

State-Year Fixed Effects

N

N

N

Y

Year-Month Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on the number of monthly
fire or smoke claims per 100,000 housing units. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state-month level
to correct for autocorrelation by state/month combinations over time.
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Table A5
Robustness Test of Table 2, Using Monthly Fire Claims per 100,000 Households
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
No Valued Policy
Valued Policy
Law Only
Law Only
Construction Cost Change
0.016
0.215
0.103* 0.197**
(12 month)
(0.113)
(0.170)
(0.060)
(0.092)
Housing Price Change (12
0.029
0.147
0.012
0.027
month)
(0.045)
(0.089)
(0.037)
(0.080)
Income Per Capita Growth
-0.009
-0.237*
0.070
-0.040
Rate (12 month)
(0.067)
(0.142)
(0.051)
(0.097)
Unemployment
0.649
0.971
-0.397
-0.521
Rate (Log)
(1.687)
(3.156)
(0.829)
(1.555)
Housing Vacancy
0.511
-1.088
0.109
0.067
Rate (Log)
(1.058)
(0.928)
(0.477)
(0.458)
Precipitation (monthly
-0.138
-0.147
-0.036
-0.050
inches)
(0.097)
(0.121)
(0.059)
(0.067)
Precipitation (monthly
0.768** 1.018* -1.775** -1.702**
extreme)
(0.366)
(0.548)
(0.770)
(0.833)
N

3,639

3,639

2,237

2,237

State Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

State-Year Fixed Effects

N

Y

N

Y

Year-Month Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on the number of monthly
fire or smoke claims per 100,000 housing units. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state-month level
to correct for autocorrelation by state/month combinations over
combinations over time.
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Table A6
Robustness Test of Table 1, Using Monthly Fire Claims per 100,000 Households,
Pro-Rating Claims in May 2008
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
--------------Total Sample-------------Valued Policy Law

-1.347*

-1.307

(0.812)

(0.822)

Construction Cost Change
(12 month)

0.040

0.089

0.047

0.187

(0.073)

(0.092)

(0.071)

(0.118)

Housing Price
Change (12 month)

0.029

0.037

0.022

0.137*

(0.036)

(0.031)

(0.033)

(0.070)

-0.009

-0.149**

0.021

-0.209*

(0.045)

(0.108)

Income per Capita Growth
Rate (12 month)

(0.071)

(0.049)

Unemployment
Rate (Log)

1.309

1.779

-0.148

0.291

(1.094)

(1.135)

(0.972)

(1.717)

Housing Vacancy
Rate (Log)

0.071

-0.215

0.394

-0.688

(0.643)

(0.623)

(0.610)

(0.575)

-0.052

-0.082

-0.092

-0.106

(0.076)

(0.082)

(0.067)

(0.090)

-0.121

0.041

-0.210

-0.091

(0.735)

(0.696)

(0.607)

(0.648)

Precipitation (monthly
inches)
Precipitation (monthly
extreme)
Foreclosure Terms
Deficiency: Most
Borrower Friendly
Deficiency: Med.
Borrower Friendly
Deficiency: Least
Borrower Friendly
Nonjudicial
Foreclosure
Redemption
Right Allowed
N

1.032*
1.039*
(0.557)
(0.577)
1.692*** 1.681***
(0.530)
(0.522)
0.980
1.033
(0.884)
(0.866)
0.533
0.471
(0.682)
(0.675)
0.636
0.619
(0.519)
(0.505)
5,925

5,925

5,925

5,925

Region Fixed Effects

Y

Y

N

N

Region-Year Fixed Effects

N

Y

N

N

State Fixed Effects

N

N

Y

Y

State-Year Fixed Effects

N

N

N

Y

Year-Month Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on the number of monthly
fire or smoke claims per 100,000 housing units. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state-month level
to correct for autocorrelation by state/month combinations over time.
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Table A7
Robustness Test of Table 2, Using Monthly Fire Claims per 100,000 Households,
Pro-Rating Claims in May 2008
(1)
(2)
No Valued Policy
Law Only
Construction Cost Change
(12 month)

(3)
(4)
Valued Policy
Law Only

0.015

0.215

0.103*

0.194**

(0.112)

(0.170)

(0.060)

(0.091)

Housing Price Change (12
month)

0.029

0.146

0.011

0.029

(0.044)

(0.090)

(0.036)

(0.081)

Income Per Capita Growth
Rate (12 month)

-0.003

-0.234

0.068

-0.040

(0.067)

(0.142)

(0.051)

(0.096)

0.652

1.016

-0.375

-0.513

(1.681)

(3.139)

(0.829)

(1.550)

0.507

-1.086

0.112

0.049

(1.052)

(0.919)

(0.475)

(0.451)

-0.138

-0.147

-0.034

-0.048

(0.057)

(0.065)

Unemployment
Rate (Log)
Housing Vacancy
Rate (Log)
Precipitation (monthly
inches)

(0.096)

(0.119)

0.758**

1.011*

(0.365)

(0.545)

(0.772)

(0.829)

3,670

3,670

2,255

2,255

State Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

State-Year Fixed Effects

N

Y

N

Y

Year-Month Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Precipitation (monthly
extreme)
N

-1.773** -1.696**

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on the number of monthly
fire or smoke claims per 100,000 housing units. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state-month level
to correct for autocorrelation by state/month combinations over
combinations over time.

Difference-in-Differences Analysis
Table 3 in the main text presented the impact on log odds for Louisiana’s
change in valued policy law. To get a sense for the change in fire claim probabilities,
Tables A8, A9, and A10 calculate the marginal effects of a change in various
variables from the models in Table 3. The marginal impacts are calculated holding
all other variables at their means.
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Table A8
Marginal Effects of Variable Changes for Difference-in-Differences Regression,
Mississippi/Texas

Time Period

----------------Region---------------All

Louisiana

Non-LA

Diff. LA vs.
Non-LA

All

20.7%

37.4%

19.1%

18.3%

Pre-Landry (2002 to May 21, 2008)

21.4%
19.9%
-1.5%

17.8%

22.5%

-4.7%

24.1%
6.3%

18.8%
-3.7%

5.3%

Post-Landry (May 21, 2008 to 2011)
Difference Post vs. Pre

Estimates report the predicted probability of a claim being a fire or smoke claim, using the estimates
from Model (1) of Table 3 and holding other values at their means.

Table A9
Marginal Effects of Variable Changes for Difference-in-Differences Regression,
Arkansas/Mississippi/Texas

Time Period

----------------Region---------------All

Louisiana

Non-LA

Diff. LA vs.
Non-LA

All

21.7%

20.8%

21.7%

-0.9%

Pre-Landry (2002 to May 21, 2008)

22.7%
20.5%
-2.2%

18.3%

23.7%

-5.4%

25.5%
7.2%

19.5%
-4.2%

6.0%

Post-Landry (May 21, 2008 to 2011)
Difference Post vs. Pre

Estimates report the predicted probability of a claim being a fire or smoke claim, using the estimates
from Model (2) of Table 3 and holding other values at their means.

Table A10
Marginal Effects of Variable Changes for Difference-in-Differences Regression,
All Valued Policy Law States
----------------Region---------------Diff. LA vs.
Non-LA

All

Louisiana

Non-LA

All

25.2%

24.3%

25.2%

-0.9%

Pre-Landry (2002 to May 21, 2008)

27.1%
23.2%
-3.9%

18.1%

29.4%

-11.3%

34.0%
15.9%

21.0%
-8.4%

13.0%

Post-Landry (May 21, 2008 to 2011)
Difference Post vs. Pre

Estimates report the predicted probability of a claim being a fire or smoke claim, using the estimates
from Model (3) of Table 3 and holding other values at their means.

Table 3 in the main text also used a twelve-month window for the housing price
and construction cost price changes. Table A11 replicates the analysis of Table 3,
varying the length of time over which the housing price and construction cost
indexes are measured.
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Table A11
Difference-in-Differences Test of Table 3
(1)
(2)
Difference-in-Difference
Coefficient Estimate

(3)

1 month

0.291***
(0.039)

0.277***
(0.044)

3 month

0.269***
(0.037)

0.262***
(0.036)

6 month

0.212***
(0.056)

0.209***
(0.054)

12 month

0.204***
(0.031)

0.223***
(0.034)

0.419***
(0.059)
0.418***
(0.059)
0.415***
(0.058)
0.433***
(0.052)

436,354

467,932

1,398,757

Mississippi,
Texas

Arkansas,
Mississippi,
Texas

All Valued
Policy Law
States

N

Comparison States

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on log-odds of a reported loss
being due to fire or smoke relative to other loss sources. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state-month
level to correct for autocorrelation by state/month combinations over
time. All regressions include state and year-month fixed effects and
control for the non-judicial foreclosure explanatory variables of Figures 4
and 5.

I also replicated the analysis of Table 3 using a linear regression, with the
monthly number of reported fire and smoke claims per 100,000 housing units as the
dependent variable and as an additional robustness test of valued policy laws’ impact.
Table A12 presents the results. Because monthly numbers do not perfectly coincide
with Louisiana’s law change (on May 21, 2008), the change was treated as occurring
on June 1, 2008. The results are similar if the change is treated as occurring May 21,
with the May 2008 claims converted into two separate monthly figures (from May
1 through May 20, inflating the per housing unit fire claim number by 31/20, and
from May 21 through May 31, inflating the per housing unit number by 31/11), as
shown in Table A13.
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Table A12
Robustness Test of Table 3, Using Monthly Fire Claims per 100,000 Households

Difference-in-Differences
Coefficient Estimate
N

Comparison States

(1)

(2)

1.787***

1.684***

(3)
1.309***

(0.450)

(0.340)

(0.404)

360

480

2,280

Mississippi
Texas

Arkansas
Mississippi
Texas

All Valued
Policy Law
States

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on the number of monthly fire
or smoke claims per 100,000 housing units. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state-month level to
correct for autocorrelation by state/month combinations over time. All
regressions include state and year-month fixed effects and control for the
non-judicial foreclosure explanatory variables of Tables 1 and 2.
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Table A13
Robustness Test of Table 3, Using Monthly Fire Claims per 100,000 Households,
Pro-Rating Claims in May 2008
(1)
(2)
(3)
1.336***
Difference-in-Differences
1.770***
1.692***
Coefficient Estimate
(0.398)
(0.419)
(0.322)
N

Comparison States

363

484

2,299

Mississippi
Texas

Arkansas
Mississippi
Texas

All Valued
Policy Law
States

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Estimated coefficients measure the impact on the number of monthly fire
or smoke claims per 100,000 housing units. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the state-month level to
correct for autocorrelation by state/month combinations over time. All
regressions include state and year-month fixed effects and control for the
non-judicial foreclosure explanatory variables of Tables 1 and 2.

Dynamic Difference-in-Differences Analysis
Figure 5 used all non-Louisiana valued policy law states as the comparison
group for the dynamic difference-in-difference analysis. The Figures below replicate
the dynamic difference-in-differences analysis of Figure 5, varying the control
groups to which Louisiana’s claims experience is compared.
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Figure A1
Dynamic Difference-in Differences Estimates
Louisiana vs. Mississippi/Texas
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Figure A2
Dynamic Difference-in Differences Estimates
Louisiana vs. Arkansas/Mississippi/Texas
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